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Abstract
Current coffee  prices are at record lows  and below the  The authors deal with the  impact of the coffee crisis
cost of production  for many producers  in Central  and strategies to deal with it. They include an analysis of
America.  Moreover,  the coffee  crisis is structural,  and  the international coffee  situation  and country-specific
changes in  supply and demand do not indicate  a quick  analyses.  The authors explore options and constraints  for
recovery of prices.  So,  coffee producers  in Central  increased  competitiveness and diversification,  and discuss
America  are facing new challenges-as  are coffee  social, environmental,  and institutional  dimensions of the
laborers, coffee  exporters,  and others linked to the coffee  crisis.
sector.  Coffee plays a major  economic  role in Costa Rica,  The authors conclude that there are specific solutions
El Salvador,  Guatemala, Honduras,  and Nicaragua. The  that can be pursued  for the  coffee sector. Some are
coffee crisis is actually part of a broader  rural crisis  already  being applied, but more can  be done  in a more
caused by weather  shocks (such as Hurricane  Mitch and  systematic way.  Also, there is a need for safety nets to
droughts), low international  agricultural commodity  deal  with the short-term  impact of the crisis.  Longer-
prices,  and the global recession.  These  challenges  call  for  term solutions are  to be found in  increased
new strategies  for Central American  countries  aimed at  competitiveness and diversification  in the context of
broad-based  sustainable  development  of their rural  broad-based  sustainable rural economic development.
economies.
This paper-a product of Rural Development,  Development  Research Group-is part  of a larger effort  in  the group  to
analyze instruments for protecting farmers against risks. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Panos Varangis, room MC5-785, telephone 202-473-3852, fax 202-
522-1142, email address pvarangis@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:/
/econ.worldbank.org.  March 2003.  (76 pages)
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development issues. An objectwve of the series is to get the findings out  quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully pollsbed. The
papers carry the names of the authors  and sbouild be cited accordingly. The ftndings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessanly represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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1. The decline of coffee prices in the international markets below 60 cents per lb. (see
figure  1) have caused a significant crisis in the coffee sectors of Central American
countries.  Given the relative  importance of coffee for the region the crisis is having
negative  economic, social and environmental  re-precautions  in these countries.
2.  Responding to the concerns expressed by various governments  in the region, the
World Bank decided to launch a study in order to examine the impact of the low prices in
the overall economies  and coffee sectors, but more importantly provide ideas on how
Central American coffee producing countries could deal with the crisis.  At the same time
the Inter-American  Development Bank (IDB) and USAID embarked on similar studies.
In November 2001  IDB and USAID initiated several country studies to evaluate the
impact of the crisis and look into possible solutions.  In January 2002, the three
institutions, IDB, USAID and World Bank, decided to join forces and prepare a
discussion paper outlining the main findings of the individual studies but focus on the
potential solutions.  In particular, the joint discussion paper discussed alternatives related
to improving quality,  marketing and exploring niche markets and on the other hand
discussed possible strategies for diversification for marginal coffee areas.  The paper also
discussed environmental  and social issues related to coffee in Central America.  The
discussion paper was presented and discussed  in a stakeholder meeting convened by the
three agencies in Antigua,  Guatemala (April 3-5,  2002).  The stakeholder mceting
involved government officials, producers, NGOs, traders/exporters,  and large
international roasters, and generated lively discussions.  The link to the website
containing a summary of the Coffee Workshop held in Antigua, Guatemala,  April 3-5,
2002 is:  http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/coffeeworkshop/
3.  The present report builds on the findings of the consultant reports prepared for IDB
and USAID, and the discussion paper and discussions during the April meeting in
Antigua.  Furthermore,  this report has compiled some additional  information on social
and environmental  issues related to coffee in Central America.  It has benefited
significantly from a recent report by CEPAL (Centroamerica: El impacto de la caida  de
losprecios del cafe') published in Mexico,  D.F., April 2002 and a study by LMC on the
coffee crisis published  in February 2002.
4.  This report first deals with assessing the impacts of the crisis and then makes
suggestions for strategies to cope with it.  In particular, the report is structured as follows.
Following this introduction, chapter 2 presents the nature and magnitude of the world
coffee crisis and argues that this is a structural  change in both world demand and supply
requiring structural  changes and repositioning of the coffee  sectors of Central American
countries.  Chapter 3 analyzes the macroeconomic impact of the crisis for the five Central
American countries and also looks at the impact on employment, production/exports,  and
finally presents some indicators of t.c competitiveness of the Central American coffee
sectors.  Chapter 4 presents what Central American governments  are doing to deal with2
the present crisis and argues that most of these measures  deal with the short term
problems of debt and price  support rather than dealing with structural  changes.  Chapter 5
outlines in general terms the options related to improving competitiveness and
diversification.  Chapter 6 presents the options for improving quality,  value added,
marketing, and promotion strategies for Central American coffees, including the use of
market-based ways to deal with price volatility and uncertainty.  Furthermore, chapter 6
indicates the key parameters for successful projects in these areas and presents the
Central American countries' position in the gourmet and niche markets for coffee.
Chapter  7 addresses the possible alternatives in terms of diversification  for Central
American  coffee farmers that cannot be competitive  in the present coffee  market.  This
section presents the key elements of a diversification strategy, the challenges facing
diversification  programs and lessons from experiences  in rural diversification worldwide.
Chapter 8 discusses the social impact of the crisis on small coffee producers and coffee
laborers  and provides  some suggestions for establishing safety nets.  Chapter  9 argues
about the importance  of coffee for the biodiversity  of Central America, highlights the
environmental  impacts of the current crisis and ways to address them and concludes by
presenting the lessons leamed from some recent World Bank projects in Central America
and Mexico  that internalize the environmental  externalities  of coffee.  Chapter  10 briefly
presents the key institutions in the coffee sector and focuses on how these institutions  and
organizations can support the development  and competitiveness of quality coffee in
Central America.  This chapter also presents key issues related to trade policy  for coffee.
Finally, Chapter  11  presents the summary conclusions and policy implications.
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II. THE NATURE  AND  MAGNITUDE  OF THE COFFEE CRISIS
5.  Over the past five years, the world coffee market has undergone important changes in
the supply  side, which reflects a steady increase in world production  and export levels.
The current crisis in prices is not only part of a cyclical phenomenon; but also, it is a
direct consequence of the new structure of the market, which is exacerbating the problem
for Central American producers.
6.  The near term price projections  are not encouraging.  With demand growing slowly
and global production  still at high levels and still expanding, most analysts predict that
coffee price recovery is likely to be slow, at least for the near term.  This threatens the
longer-term sustainability of coffee production in Central America.
A. Structural Changes in the World Coffee Market
7. In the  1  990s, prices of coffee were mainly affected by shifts in Brazilian production
(caused mainly by frosts), subsequent adjustments by coffee suppliers responding to price
shifts, and a slow but steady expansion of coffee production in other countries, especially
Vietnam. This period contrasted to a generally downward trend in prices from highs in
the mid- 1  970s. The loss of about 13 million bags of Brazilian production in the mid-
1990s pushed prices to a high level.
8. By the end of the 1990s, however, Brazilian post-frost replanting----freed  from
government constraints on tree density and planting techniques, as well as the opening of
new production areas----has  increased production  and, hence, increased world supply.
Brazilian cost of production have also declined through the adoption of improved
technologies  and in particular mechanized harvesting.  In addition, new investments
(plantings) in Vietnam and increasing production from other traditional producing
countries led to a substantial  coffee surplus.
9.  During 2000  and 2001,  worldwide oversupply caused coffee prices to drop to their
lowest levels in 30 years---or to a 1  00-year low, if adjusted for inflation. Coffee prices
have plummeted below the cost of production for many coffee producers,  causing
financial and social hardships  to farmers  and laborers.
10.  Total current production of green coffee is about 1  15 million bags (60 kilo net).  This
exceeds consumption of about 105 million bags (80 million in importing countries and 25
million in producing countries).  Over-production has led to the accumulation of
inventories in producing and consuming countries, and the drop in world prices.
11.  Apart from over-supply, two other principal factors are underlying the current crisis:
structural changes in demand, and changes in the nature of the supply of quality coffee
from Brazil and Vietnam.4
B. Changes in demand
12.  Overall, world demand has recovered from the small drop that resulted from the
price increase in 1994/95. As a result of economic liberalization and growth in emerging
countries, notably in Eastern Europe, parts of Asia, and Latin America (especially
Brazil), world demand has reached  about 105 million bags. This world total masks a
number of trends:
o  Aggregate  demand in the major importing countries is growing slowly, if at all.
This suggests that increases in the high quality end of the market are being partly
offset by losses elsewhere.  Meanwhile,  new non-traditional markets are
emerging and growing quickly, driven by the availability of cheap coffees in
soluble form.
o  Roasters have learned to increase the absorption of natural and robusta coffees by
such processes  as steaming to remove the harshness of taste.
o  Roasters have learned to work with lower working stocks. This has increased the
requirements of the logistical capabilities on suppliers.  This, in turn, has favored
large trading companies,  and has led to consolidation of the supply chain in fewer
major traders.
o  Roasters have become more flexible in their ability to make short-term switches
between coffee types.
o  The consolidation of roasters in periods of oversupply has led to a situation where
prices at the retail level may not necessarily reflect the reductions in green coffee
prices in  world markets.
o  A small but viable segment of the market has emerged that focuses on quality and
product differentiation (specialty and gourmet coffees).
13.  In addition to these trends, income  effects are proving to be a significant factor in
coffee consumption. Consumption in northern Europe, particularly in Germany,  is
stagnant, but is increasing somewhat in southern Europe, and growing in much of Eastern
Europe.  However, the increase in consumption in Eastern Europe  and in parts of Asia
recovering  from economic problems is being driven by the high availability of cheap
robustas, which have allowed roasters to make a product available at "affordable" prices.
In Brazil, roasters have taken an opposite approach, concentrating  on labeling and quality
in the domestic market.  This has allowed Brazil to increase domestic demand and
become the world's second largest consumer. This example  is relevant for a Central
American strategy.
C. Changes in qualitv
14.  While supply has expanded,  the quality of green coffee in some parts of the world
has also been improving.  Higher quality beans from Brazil, derived from better washing
capabilities and quality controls,  are intensifying the competition against "Extra Hard,"
"Prime," and "Extra Prime" coffees from Central America. Although Vietnam's coffee
quality is still low, some quality improvements in Vietnam---as evidenced by some recent5
favorable  grading results from the coffee futures markets---are  allowing roasters to use
more of these (Brazilian and Vietnamese) coffees.  At the same time, there are  growing
consumer markets for gourmet and other specialty coffees  (gourmet, fair-trade,  organic,
eco-friendly,  etc.) that command a significant price premium.6
111.  COFFEE IN CENTRAL AMERICA  I[N VIEW OF THE RECENT CRISIS
15.  This section presents the key characteristics of the coffee sectors in the five Central
American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador,  Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua)  and
highlights the impact of the recent coffee crisis on these sectors and national economies.
16.  The five Central American countries together are the second largest coffee producer
behind Brazil.  Coffee production  varies amongst the Central American countries but it is
typically characterized by small holder production.2 Table  1.1  below presents the main
characteristics of coffee production in the various  countries.
Table 1.1:  Kev Characteristics  of  ee Production  in Central  Ameri  (1999  2000)
Average
Production  Area  # producers  yield  farm size  Exports  % of total
quintals  000 ha  quintals/ha  ha  mill  US$  exports
Guatemala  6,794,022  267  62,649  25.5  4.3  597.8  21.0
Costa  Rica  3,608,940  115  73,707  31.4  1.6  308 7  5.3
El Salvador  2,982,157  162  23,597  18.4  6.9  311.5  11.0
Nicaragua  1,457,135  100  30,400  14.8  3 2  194 7  26.5
Honduras  3,913,460  260  90,000  15.0  2.9  345.2  26.1
Data for 1999/00
Manzana  (mz) = 0.7 ha
Quintal (qq) = 100  lbs or 46kg
Source:  estimates using data from the IDB country reports
A.  The macroeconomic impact of the coffee crisis.
17.  During  1999/00 coffee in Central America accounted for about $1.7 billion,
corresponding to about  11% in total export revenues.  Coffee  was an important  source of
export revenues in Guatemala,  Nicaragua, and Honduras, but less so in Costa Rica and El
Salvador.  However,  during 2000/01  the share of coffee in total exports has dropped to
less than half of what it was in 1999/2000 mainly due to the price decline,  ranging from
about 3-4% for Costa Rica to 14% for Nicaragua.
18.  At the macroeconomic  level, national governments  and banks are also affected by the
loss of trade-generated  earnings.  Central American countries  have suffered a 44 percent
decline in revenue  from coffee exports in one year (see table  1.2). Export revenues from
' Panama is not included  because of the small size of its coffee production and the fact that coffee  is not
very important for Panama's economy.
2  At least there  are more  smallholder producer than medium  and  larger producers.  On the other hand, larger
producers usually account for a significant share of the production.7
coffee dropped from US$1.7 billion to US$938 from crop year  1999/2000 to 2000/2001,
and are estimated to fall further to about US$700 million in 2001/2002.  The decrease in
exports hurts the balance of payments and significantly affects  overall economic activity,
particularly due to the broad impact of expenditures of coffee farmers and laborers. The
coffee sector debt and past due loans hamper the financial  sector, limiting banking
activity and financing to other economic  sectors.
Table 1. 2. Decline in Coffee Export Revenues,  1999/00-2000/01
(US$  million)
Country/Crop year  1999/  2000/  1  Change  (%/0)
2000  2001
Guatemala  598  400  -38%
Honduras  345  167  -33%
El Salvador  276  108  -61%
Nicaragua  170  85  -50%
Costa Rica  289  178  -52%
Total  1,678  938  -44%
Source: IDB/USAID/WB  studies
19.  The decline of coffee export revenues has contributed to the increase of the BOP
deficit  in the Central American countries, despite an increase in remittances and lower
interest rates to service the external debt.  In 2001, this BOP deficit for the five Central
American countries reached $3.65  billion, equivalent to about 6%  of GDP.  However,
despite the significant decline of coffee export revenues, the loss corresponds only to
1.2% of GDP on average for the five countries as a whole.  While the macroeconomic
impact of the crisis maybe limited, there is a sectoral impact particularly  in terms of the
profitability of the sector, the employment  and the environment.  These issues are
discussed  below.
B. The inpact of  the crisis on production and export volumes
20.  Lower prices usually induce producers, particularly the less competitive ones  to
reduce production.  However, comparing coffee production and exports in Central
America since  1990 (see table  1.3)  it can be observed that during the period 1990 to 2001
coffee production has increased by about  14% and exports by about 22%.  There have
been variations  amongst countries.  Nicaragua has registered the highest increases  in both
production and export volumes, followed by Honduras and Guatemala.  On the other
hand, production  and exports in El Salvador have shown a significant decline followed by
Costa Rica.  This picture does not change much if we select a different period of time in
the 1990s as a basis of comparison.  However, comparing production and exports
between 2000 and 2001, it is evident that there is an overall decline of about  10%.  Most
of the decline is in the production of El Salvador and then Honduras.  There  have been
several reports that due to low prices farmers  do not tend their farms  and apply less
agrochemicals.  Evidence indicates that between 2000 and 2001, overall coffee yields
declined  in Central America, with the largest declines registered in El Salvador (-25%),8
Nicaragua (-20%) and Honduras (-17%).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the
decline  is due to lower prices although it is possible that recent droughts and other
climate-related  effects have also played a role. Nevertheless, (a) it is too difficult to come
up with conclusions based on just two periods of data (2000 and 2001),  and (b) it may be
too early to assess the full impact of low prices since it usually takes some time for
production and exports to respond to prices.
Table 1.3:  Coffee Production and Exoort Volumes in Central  America
Exports (in thousands of q  uintals)  % Chang
1990  11997  1998  1999  2000  2001  1990-2001 1998-2001
Costa  Rica  3,043  2,506  2,914  2,824  3,046  2,760  -10  3%  -5 3%
El Salvador  3,026  3,712  2,474  2,389  3,258  2,235  -35.4%  -9 7%
Guatemala  4,419  5,547  4,629  6,108  6,317  5,886  24 9%  27.2%
Honduras  2,995  3,796  5,137  4,379  6,415  5,515  45.7%  7 4%
Nicaragua  800  893  1,207  1,204  1,678  1,855  56.9%  53.7%
Total Central America  14,283  16,454  16,361  16,904  20,714  18,251  21.7%  11.6%
Production (in thousands  quint  Ils)  % Change
1990  1995  2000  2001  1990-2001  1995-2001
Costa Rica  3,308  3,306  3,391  3,263  -1 4%  -1 3%
El Salvador  3,132  3,040  2,798  2,091  -33.2%  -31  2%
Guatemala  4,200  4,700  5,516  5,500  31.0%  17 0%
Honduras  2,604  2,919  4,266  3,549  36.3%  216%
Nicaragua  932  894  2,083  1,800  931%  101.3%
Total Central America  14,176  14,859  18,054  16,203  14 3%  9.0%
Source: CEPAL (2002), based on official figures
C  The impact of the coffee crisis on employment.
21.  Coffee  is a very important source of employment for the rural sector in Central
America.  On average, over one quarter of the rural labor force is employed in the coffee
sector.  It is worth noting that in Nicaragua,  42% of rural labor is employed in coffee.
Table  1.4 below shows the total employment in coffee  and as a share of the total rural
employment.
Table 1.4: Estimated  Employment in Coffee Production  in Central  Aierica
Country  Economically  Active  Labor Force Employed  % Rural Labor
Labor Force in Rural  in Coffee  Employed in
Areas  Coffee
Costa Rica  725,000  200,000  28%
El Salvador  936,000  160,000  17%
Guatemala  2,286,000  700,000  31%
Honduras  1,152,000  300,000  26%
Nicaragua  672,000  280,000  42%
TOTAL  5,771,000  1,640,000  28%
Central  America
Source: CEPAL (2002,  p.21)9
22.  Low coffee prices are causing unemployment to reach critical levels in Central
America.  In the last two crop seasons,  seasonal employment has decreased  by more than
20 percent, while permanent employment has plummeted by more than 50 percent (see
table  1.5). More than half the permanent labor force is now working at less than half
capacity.  Wages have also fallen as farms have received  lower coffee revenues and the
supply of labor has swelled through unemployment. CEPAL (2002) estimated that the
loss of employment has resulted in a loss salary income of about $140 million for Central
America as a whole, of which coffee workers in Guatemala have lost in salaries $62
million followed by Honduran coffee workers who lost $37 million.  Further details about
the employment situation in the coffee sector, the typology of producers and the social
impact of the crisis are discussed in chapter VIII.
Table 1.5. Decline in Employment in the Central American Coffee Sector,  2000-2002
(thousands of workers)*
Worker / Crop year  20001  2001/  Chang  (%)
2001  1  2002
Seasonal  1  1,7001  1,3501  -21%
Permanent  350  160  -54%
* In Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua,  and Costa Rica
Source:  IADB/USAID/WB studies
23.  The situation is especially critical because, unlike other crops, the majority of coffee
producers are smallholders living in remote rural areas, who heavily depend on their own
harvest and extra cash from temporary picking work. These growers  depend on this cash
income to pay for food and other essential items such as school fees and health care, and
they have no cash reserves on which to draw from in hard times. A crisis in the sector
creates  social imbalances, a general  downturn in the rural economy,  accelerated
migration to urban areas and other countries, and potential for instability.
24.  Coffee  is produced by many small farmers who account for only a small percentage
of the total production.  In contrast larger farmers, although a small percentage of the
total farmers,  account for most production. The largest concentration  of production
amongst medium and large farmers is in Guatemala  and El Salvador,  followed by
Nicaragua.  Costa Rica and Honduras have a significant part of their coffee production
from small producers.  Table  1.6 below summarizes the share of production by farmer
size.10
Table 1.6:  Coffee  Production  bv Producer  Size
Less than  M1O0qc  More than
_%roduction  % producer  cuintals  %Droduction % Droducers
Guatemala  20.0%  79 8%  2000gg  50.0%  5.6%
Costa  Rica  38.2%  90.2%  800gg  23 0%  0 5%
Nicaragua  14.0%  89.6%  1500gg  36.0%  0.6%
El  Salvador  9.6%  80.8%  1000qq  57.8%  4.0%
Honduras  44.7%  92.0%*  1000qq  10.6%  3 0%*
Source: estimates using data from the IDB country reports
Note: * are very approximate estimates
D. Environmental  Problems  Arisigg from the Current  Coffee Crisis
25.  Environmental issues are not of high priority to many producers struggling to cope
with the coffee price crisis. Existing environmental problems have, in some cases,
worsened.  Meanwhile, some new environmentally  related problems have intensified,
such as destruction of shade forest---followed by decreasing biodiversity---and
destruction of ecosystems and natural habitats.  Chapter IX discusses in details the
environmental  issues of coffee production and possible strategies to deal with them, but
here are some of the key environmental  issues arising from the crisis:
26.  Reduced application  of  agro-chemicals. The crisis has led the reduction in the
application of agro-chemical  in almost all the Central American countries (Guzman
2002).  This may have some beneficial  short-term consequences  for the environment
(water contamination  and soil) but it may lead to spread of diseases (e.g. leaf rust, etc.)
and in the longer term the low profitability may induce farmer to switch to other crops.
27.  Abandoning the farm, or growing new crops instead of  coffee.  The low price of
coffee especially'places  pressures on producers to grow other crops to supplement or
substitute for coffee,  in order to survive.  The new crops might not be adequate for the
soils and slopes in the coffee regions, and introducing the inadequate crops could cause
serious erosion problems.  Furthermore, abandoning the coffee plantation and leaving
cherries un-harvested  can cause serious plagues and infestations of pests the following
year, making it difficult to reinitiate any agricultural production.
28.  Destroying  the shade  forest. The coffee crisis drives traditional coffee producers to
cut down and sell the shade forest as timber or firewood.  Introducing new crops as a
substitute for coffee can motivate  clearing of the coffee plants and surrounding areas,
using slash and burn techniques.
29.  Limited implementation of cleaner  technology. Over the past years, an increasing
number of wet mills have implemented water and energy saving measures, and promoted
their mills as environmentally friendly or certified.  The coffee crisis might prevent new
mills from investments that implement such measures.  There is some evidence (seeI1
Guzman 2002) that in Central American countries, with a possible exception Costa Rica,
the current coffee crisis has lead to a reduction of sound environmental  practices at the
level of wet milling.
E. The competitive Position of Central  American coffees in view of  the crisis
30.  Two obvious ways that Central American countries can compete is through
improvements in productivity (higher yields and lower costs) and through emphasis in
producing better quality  coffees, including penetrating  specialty markets.3
31.  Productivity and costs of  production.  Average coffee yields vary amongst countries
with Costa Rica and Guatemala having higher yields compared to the other countries.
Although the average farm size in Costa Rica is about 1.6  ha (or 2.2 manzanas), average
yields are very high (one of the highest in the world) because of the adoption of high
yielding technologies  and use of agrochemicals.  Central American countries have
improved their yields during the past decade.4 Table  1.7 below compares the average
yield for the period 2001  and 2000 to the yields in 1990 and  1995 respectively.  It shows
that with the exception of El Salvador,  coffee yields in Central America have improved in
all countries.  Nicaragua,  Guatemala and Honduras have shown the largest increases  in
yields.  At about 18 quintals per ha, average coffee yields in Central America  are
comparable to those of leading world coffee producing  countries such as Brazil (1  7qq/ha)
and Colombia (1 8qq/ha),  but below those of new and dynamic producers  such as
Vietnam (48 qq/ha) and India (21  qq/ha).5
Table 1. 7:  Chanmes in Coffee Yields
1990-2000/01  1995-2000/01  2000-2001
Costa Rica  9%  4%  -4%
El Salvador  -20%  -19%  -25%
Guatemala  28%  13%  0%
Honduras  22%  23%  -17%
Nicaragua  40%  75%  -20%
Central America  11%  9%  -11%
Source: elaborated from CEPAL (2002) based on official data
32.  In terms of cost of production,  table 1.8 below presents the costs of production
estimated by the various consultants of the IDB/WB/USAID  (2002) study, of the CEPAL
(2002) study, and LMC (2002). The IDB/WB/USAID data refer to the crop year
1999/2000 while the CEPAL data refer to 2001. The T  LMC  estimates refer to the 2000/01
crop year.  In the case of Nicaragua and Honduras, the estimates from the local
consultants for the IDB/WB/USAID  study were able to distinguish between three  levels
3Penetrating specialty markets is a partial  solution that will work for some but not the majority of farmers.
4  It  should be noted that higher productivity  (in terms of yields) may not necessarily  mean  higher
profitability.  Being more productive may be less important than improving the marketability of production.
Furthermore,  higher yields are often accompanied by higher labor and input costs.
5  Figures refer to quintals per hectare (qq/ha)  and are estimates for the 2000/01  crop year presented in the
CEPAL  (2002) report, table  A-2.of technology:  traditional (very low use of inputs), semi-technified,  and technified.
Although there are certain differences between the data presented  in the table below, it
appears that there  is rather consistent ranking of countries in terms of costs of production.
The highest cost producer appears to be Costa Rica,  followed by Guatemala,  then
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.  However, from the LMC study, El Salvador
appears  to be the second highest cost producer of the group.  Taking this ranking into
consideration and looking at what happened with production, it can be noted that the
highest cost producer (Costa Rica) has contracted its production during the  1990s, and so
did El Salvador.
Table 1.8:  Costs of Production_
Consultants  CEPAL  LiC
US$/quintal  US$/quintal  US$/quintal
Guatemala  51  74  74
Costa Rica  77  86  100
El Salvador  48  57  84








Source:  the first column "consultants"  refers to cost estimates  obtained through the various
country study reports prepared by individual consultants for the IDB/WB/USAID  study.  The
second  column refers to the cost estimates presented by CEPAL (2002, p.30).  These estimates
are based on cost information  form the various  coffee institutes.  The third  column refers to
estimates made by the LMC report, "Coffee in Crisis", 2002.
33.  A possible explanation about El Salvador is that the costs (CEPAL and
IDB/WB/USAID) do not include financial  costs and El Salvador's coffee  sector appears
to be heavily indebted.  Taking into consideration  the financial  costs puts El Salvador
amongst the high cost producers.  Furthermore,  coffee production  in El Salvador has
suffered from various adverse climatic conditions during the 1  990s, imposing additional
rehabilitation costs.
34.  Finally the LMC (2002) report provides  some evidence as to the cost competitive
position of Central American countries vis-a-vis.  other coffee producers  in the world.
The study has considered  22 coffee producing countries from Latin America,  Asia and
Africa.  By examining the various individual producing country costs, it can be seen that
Nicaragua and Honduras are amongst the lower cost producers  in the group of 22 main
coffee producers, Guatemala falls somewhere in the middle and Costa Rica and El
Salvador  are in the high cost group.  Note that Vietnam ranks as the lowest cost producer13
followed by Indonesia.6 The "expensive" items that make  certain Central American
countries to rank as higher cost producers in the LMC report are:  labor (Costa Rica),
capital/financing  (El Salvador),  and inputs (Guatemala).
35.  Types of coffee and coffee quality. Most coffee in Central America can be classified
as high and strictly high grown coffee.  This corresponds to coffee grown above 800
meters.  Coffees grown between 800-1,200 meters are usually classified as hard bean
(HB)  and above  1,200 meters are classified as strictly hard (SHB) and often command
significant premiums in the market.  Table  1.9 below shows the share of coffee
production that comes from higher altitude.  It is worth noting that the highest share of
production classified as strictly hard bean (SHB) is found in Nicaragua, then Guatemala
followed by Costa Rica and the lowest is found in El Salvador.  The highest share of
production'coming from above 800 meters  is in Honduras followed by Nicaragua, then
Guatemala and Costa Rica, while the lowest share  comes from El Salvador.  However,
although Guatemalan  and Costa Rican coffees usually command significant premiums for
quality coffee, Honduras  is penalized (sells at discount) even though most of its coffee
can be classified  as high grown.  Trade sources often sight that the reason for the
discounts for Honduran coffees  is the inadequate harvest and post-harvest preparation.
Table 1.9: Share of Coffee Classiied as High and Strictly HiRk  Grown
SHB  HB  SHB plus HB
Costa Rica  39%  24%  63%
Guatemala  45%  19%  64%
El Salvador  15%  32%  47%
Nicaragua  85%  NA  85%
Honduras  19%  67%  86%
Source:  estimates using data from the IDB country reports
Note:  SHB (strictly hard bean)  is  for  1200 meters and above and HB (hard bean)is  between
800m and 1200 meters.
36.  The above data clearly indicate that there  is good potential for Central American
coffees to access quality and specialty markets.  Particularly, there is great potential  in
places like Nicaragua and Honduras where climatic,  soil and altitude conditions are
appropriate for the majority of coffee produced,  yet coffees from Nicaragua and
Honduras do not have the name recognition  as coffees from Guatemala and Costa Rica.
El Salvador appears the least able in the group to exploit very high quality markets for
coffee.
37.  Central America,  as a region, has been a leading exporter to gourmet,  fair trade and
organic markets along with Mexico  and Colombia.  Table  1.10 presents some estimates
of actual exports in the various specialty coffee market segments (differentiated,  organic,
fair trade) as well as some estimates of the potential certifiable capacity for organic and
fair trade coffees.
6Vietnam  and Indonesia  are mainly robusta producers and cost of production  for robusta coffee are usually
lower compared to arabicas.14
Table 1.10: Exports and  Potential  Capacit  for Sp  cialt  Coffee Markets
Coffee sold
to  Near-term  Potential
Differentiated  Organic  certifiable  Fair trade  Share  registered
organic
markets  exports  potential  exports  of fair trade  fair trade capacity
% exports  000 baas  000 bags  000 baas  % exPorts  000 bags
Costa Rica  35-40%  NA  NA  16  0 9%  41
El Salvador  5%  4.6  11  6 (2001)  0 5%  12
Guatemala  40-50%  10 (2000)  35  22 (2000)  0.7%  60 (2001)
Honduras  10-15%  NA  5  8-11  (2000)*  0.4%  51(2001)
Nicaragua  10-15%  10 (2000)  NA  24 (2000)  2.0%  135 (2001)
*  Includes fair trade and organic
Source:  estimates calculated by Daniele Giovannucci  (consultant) from various sources and Fair-
trade Labeling Organization International  (FLOI)
38.  The table above indicates that a significant amount of exports from Costa Rica and
Guatemala  are sold into differentiated markets.7 Even in these countries, the potential for
exporting more into organic and fair trade markets is significant.  Nicaragua  and
Honduras export relatively little into differentiated  markets.  But Nicaragua is exporting,
relative to other Central American countries, a significant amount to fair trade and
organic markets.  In particular, for the differentiated markets, Nicaragua  and Honduras,
with their high percentage of high altitude coffee, the older varietals, the microclimates
and traditional  production methods found in these two countries, give a substantial
potential for improvements and increase market share.  It should be noted that while
exports of differentiated  coffees overall can have a significant share, exports to fair trade
and organic markets are very small (below  1% in most cases) and even reaching their
short-medium term potential, most Central American countries should not expect to have
more than 5% of their exports into organic and fair trade markets.  However, increasing
exports into differentiated  coffee markets may well be one of the ways to deal with the
current coffee crisis.
39.  Some indication about the quality premiums (or discounts) for Central American
coffees can be provided by looking at the export unit values.8 While export unit values
are not an accurate indication of quality premiums, they nevertheless provide some idea
about the average value of the bulk of coffees exported from these countries.  Table  1.11
below shows the export unit values for Central American coffees.  This table indicates
that over the last 11  years the export unit values for Costa Rica, El Salvador Guatemala,
and Nicaragua are at somewhat similar levels, while Honduras ranks quite low.
7 Differentiated  markets for coffee signify gourmet, fair-trade,  organic,  shade grown, and other types of
specialty coffees.  These coffees  have specific attributes (quality, social, environmental,  etc.) that
distinguish them from the "bulk" commodity coffee.
8 Export unit values are calculated by dividing the total value of coffee exports by tlie total volume of
coffee exports.15
Interestingly, and despite their lower penetration in specialty coffee markets both
Nicaragua and El Salvador rank very closely to Costa Rica and Guatemala in terms of
export unit values.  This may reveal something about the relatively lower consistency of
coffee quality grades in the latter two countries.  Another important observation is that
the 2001 estimated coffee export unit values for Central America are significantly below
those during  1990, the year after the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement.
Table 1.11: Export Unit Values for Coffee in Central  American Countries
Export Prices ($1qq)  1990  1997  2000  2001
Costa Rica  81  166  90  67
El Salvador  81  136  96  59
Guatemala  73  112  92  65
Honduras  79  86  53  33
Nicaragua  85  136  101  59
Central America  78  121  81  54
Source: CEPAL (2002)
40.  Another indication of quality premiums and discounts is given in the table 1.  12
below that summarizes  the premiums and discounts of Central American coffees.
Premiums and discounts are reported daily by Complete Coffee Coverage, a daily
publication on prevailing  coffee prices in the market.  These premiums/discounts  change
by the day and the table below is a snapshot of them during the week of July 15, 2002.
Thus although this table reflects  how the market values each of these coffees at a given
time, caution needs to be exercised in reading it because it reflects the situation over a
very brief period of time.  The table is structured as follows.  It shows the premiums  and
discounts (inside parenthesis)  of Central American coffees vis-a-vis. the New York C
contract price for September delivery.  The table divides coffees  into two principle
categories:  SHG (Strictly High Grown) European preparation and Primes.  For
comparison, the Colombia Supremo  is used for the SHG and the Brazilian Santos is used
for the Primes.  The table also includes quotes for Mexican High Grown (HG) coffee and
for Mexican Prime coffees.  During the period in July 2002 that the table was constructed
there were no quotes for Costa Rican coffees.  The table shows that Colombia Supremo
commands  a high premium in the market,  while Guatemalan and Nicaraguan SHG
coffees also trade at a premium.  SHG coffees from El Salvador and Honduras sell at
discounts, in fact at levels below the High Grown (HG) Mexican coffee.  Looking at the
discounts for the Primes, it can be seen that all primes sell at discounts which are higher
compared to Brazilian Santos 2/3.  However, given the possibility for substituting some
of the Central American Prime coffees for Brazilian Santos 2/3, the price differentials  are
such as roasters would likely try to use as much Santos 2/3 as possible at the expense of
Central American Primes.
41.  There are somewhat  similar messages from the export unit values for 2001  (table
1. 1)  and the market differentials presented in table 1.12.  Honduran coffees appear to be
fetching lower prices compared to other Central American coffees, while Guatemala and
perhaps Nicaragua fetch higher prices.  El Salvador coffees appear to trade at discounts
vis-a-vis.  other Central American and Mexican coffees, with the possible exception of
Honduran coffees.16
Table 1.12:  Coffee Price Differeninfals  During Mid-July 2002
SHG  Prime
Nicaragua  $3  NA
Honduras  (-$4)  NA
Guatemala  $5.5  (-$3)
El Salvador  (-$3)  (-$5)
Mexico  (-$2) for HG  (-$3) to (-$4)
Brazil Santos 2/3  (-$19)
Colombia Supremo  $7 5 to $8
Source:  Complete Coffee Coverage;  17 July 2002
Notel:  SHG=strictly high grown; HG=high grown; the SHG prices are for European preparation.
Note 2: All numbers are US$ per quintal (100 Ibs) and they signify premiums (discounts) vis-a-
vis. the New York coffee C contract price for September delivery at the exchange.  Inside
parentheses  are negative numbers signifying discounts vis-a-vis. the New York C contract price.17
IV. RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
42.  The present coffee crisis has similarities with the crisis following the collapse of the
International  Coffee Agreement in 1989.9  The collapse of the prices in the early  1990s
was met by the creation of emergency funds in Costa Rica and El Salvador with the
objective of supporting the prices received  by producers.'0 To deal with the current
crisis, Central American countries have responded in various ways.  The measures
adopted rely on similar short term schemes:  compensating funds to support producer
prices and refinancing of the debt.  Less commonly used are programs for longer-term
structural  change of their coffee sectors with the objective of improving quality and
productivity and also in considering possible diversification alternatives for certain areas.
43.  Costa Rica has the National Fund for Coffee Stabilization (FONECAFE) that was
created in 1992 to respond to the crisis following the collapse of the International Coffee
Agreement in 1989.  This fund has as objective  to compensate  farmers when the final
price (precio de liquidacion) is below the costs of production by more than 2.5%, and
when there are funds available.  The maximum debt (size) that the fund can assume is
$50 million.  During  1994-1997, the producers not only repaid the funds but also
FONECAFE  accumulated additional  $23 million.  These  funds enabled FONECAFE to
provide support of $6.3 8/fanega to producers for 1998-99  and 1999-2000. "  For 2001,
coffee producers received from FONECAFE $18.76 per fanega produced as support for
the crisis.  Of these payments, $6.38 were from the previous savings in FONECAFE
while the reminder will need to be repaid into the fund when FOB prices exceed $92 per
quintal (100 lbs).  For the new funds, FONECAFE  issued two bonds for $25 million, for
10 years at a rate of 8% with 3 years of grace in the repayment of principle.
44.  In addition, the Chamber of Coffee producers,  the cooperatives,  and the Union of
small producers (UPANACIONAL)  have agreed with the government to restructure  the
coffee producers'  debt with millers/processors (beneficiadores)  and banks.  The debts
were estimated at $120 million.  The proposal  is for the creation of a trust fund that will
issue bonds worth $120 million.  The bonds will have an endorsement from the
government for $25 million, $10 million from ICAFE, $10 million from the Institute for
Cooperative  Development (INFOCOOP)  and $75 million guarantees from the
millers/processors,  banks and producers.  The trust fund will purchase the producers'  debt
and hold it for 10 years.
45.  Finally, ICAFE  is implementing two programs for 2001/02 crop.  One is the
retention of the 5% lowest quality coffee and the second is for a plan to improve the
overall quality of exportable coffee from Costa Rica.
S  see Akiyama and Varangis (1990)
'O  For more information about the policy responses in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Mexico due to the
collapse of coffee prices  in 1989-90 see Jaramillo (1991).
"  One fanega equals one quintal or 100 pounds.18
46.  El SaRvador established an Emergency Fund for Coffee  (Fondo de Emergenciapara
la Caficultura)  for an amount of US$45 million.  This fund was established  in 1992 in
response to the decline in coffee prices after 1989.  The fund was distributed  to all
producers independently of their level of debts,  capacity of repayment or availability of
collateral.  Funds were obtained through an international loan and were to be repaid
totally by 1999/2000.  During the period of price  recovery,  1994 to  1997/98, producers
managed to reduce their longer term debt.  However,  in 1998 a severe drought reduced
production substantially and producers'  debt swelled again.  Furthermore,  after 1999,
coffee prices declined significantly  and this prompted the creation  of a second emergency
fund (Fondo de Emergencia  II) in 2000.  The 2000 fund received  $80 million through the
issuance of a bond.  Producers receive $25/qq of their average production  1998/99 and
1999/2000.  The producers will have to repay  $5/qq annually plus  11%  interest.
47.  In addition, for the longer-term  there is a program for the renovation of the coffee
farms (Programa  Integral  de Renovacion del Parque  Cafetalero). This program was
designed by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Banco Multisectorial  de Inversiones
(BMI) and consists of $100  million that will be made available for the renovation of
coffee farms,  financed through the banking system.  The program consists of two main
components.  The first component is a credit at 9% interest rate,  for 15  years with 5 years
grace period.  It is for financially solvent producers  with more than 25 manzanas situated
in areas  800 meters or higher.  The second component is a technical assistance,  that is a
grant and it is not reimbursable.
48.  Despite all these measures, at the end of the 2000/01 the situation was very difficult.
Banks have reduced their working capital lending from $40/qq to $20/qq while BMI
estimated that debts in the sector could have been as high as $250 million even after the
$80 million support from the Emergency Fund during 2000.  This caused the creation of
another program, the Programa  de Rescate Cafetalero.  This is an integrated program
consisting of four components:
o  The creation of a trust fund (FICAFE) to restructure  the debt of producers.
o  Supplemental  credit for production  for the 2001/02  equivalent to $20/qq.
O  Elimination of the lowest 5% quality of coffee.
O  Credit for harvest for the 2001/02 crop.
49.  In Guatemala, a trust fund was authorized by the Congress with the support of the
federal  government to finance producers for the following programs:  (i) diversification
out of coffee (funds for planting, maintenance,  harvest), (ii) agro-processing  (equipment,
machinery, working capital, physical  infrastructure),  (iii) marketing,  and (iv) debt
restructuring.  The trust fund was authorized to raise $ 100 million through bonds offered
in the domestic market at an interest rate of 8.5%.  The trust fund was established  in
October of 2001  and is administered  by the Bank of Rural Development  (BANRURAL).
The very small and small  farmers (around 50,000)  are to receive around $40 million
while the medium and large ones (around  12,000) will receive around $60 million.
50.  In Honduras the government, through the National  Coffee Fund (Fondo  Cafetero
Nacional) provided 330 million Lempiras (around $20 million) to coffee producers.  With19
these funds, each coffee producer received  100 Lempiras per quintal of green coffee
produced.  During 2000/01 producers received 70 Lempiras per quintal of green coffee
produced.  Producers  are expected to repay these funds to FCN through an export tax
possibly as early during the 2002/03 harvest year.  Additionally, the government has
reduced the cost of export certification from $6 to $5 per quintal.  It should be noted that
Honduran export costs, fees and taxes, have fueled a significant flow of coffee to
Guatemala,  El Salvador and Nicaragua to avoid these charges. 12
51.  In Nicaragua the process to support the coffee sector met with significant delays.
The decline  of prices have precluded many farmers from repaying their debt to banks and
exporters and traders.  It is estimated that coffee producers owe around $70 million which
corresponds to about 2.7% of the GDP.  The producers asked the government to intervene
in order to design a contingency program to deal with their debt and a law that will
prohibit the foreclosure of their properties.  The crisis not only affects the producers  but
also the banks,, micro-finance  institutions, traders, roasters and even international
companies.  Finally the government promised to assist those producers with debts to the
banks and exporters and gave a loan of $25 per quintal to be repaid in 8 years.  It is
estimated that by the end of 2001 this measure has benefited around  15% of the
producers, mainly the larger ones.
52.  To summarize, Costa Rica and El Salvador have used in the past emergency funds
to support the income of producers when prices declined.  The funds were repaid because
of the recovery of coffee prices during  1994-97.  Without this temporary price recovery
the repayment would have been questionable.  To respond to the coffee  crisis after 1999,
both Costa Rica and El Salvador and now Honduras are again using emergency funds
whose repayment will again rely on Lhe recovery of world coffee prices.  If recovery is
slow and prices remain at relatively low levels, it will hamper the ability of farmers to
repay.
53.  In addition,  and in response to the coffee crisis, Costa Rica, El Salvador,  Guatemala
and Nicaragua are using programs  to restructure the debt of coffee  farmers.  These
programs mainly benefit the medium and larger farmers who receive formal credit.  At
the same time, some (if these countries  are starting to embark in longer-term  projects to
diversify, renovate their coffee plantations, improve their marketing and quality of their
exportable  coffees.  However,  the main focus of the response so far still remains the
short-term solution:  keeping producers in coffee by providing support to prices and
solving their debt problems.  As will be discussed in chapter VIII, most small producers
and laborers have not benefited directly form programs aimed at helping the coffee
sector.
12 The total costs and other charges  for exporting coffee are  estimated to  reach up to $17-20  per quintal.20
V.  STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING COMPETETIVENESS  AND
DIIVERSIFECATfON:  GENERAL ISSUES
54.  As pointed out in previous sections, the coffee sector is an important component of
the economies of the Central American nations in terms of employment and exports.13
The heavy reliance of Central American economies on coffee renders them vulnerable to
market downturns and to the competitive pressures  that exist in the industry.  The coffee
crisis has actually been "brewing" for some time now, but has recently percolated
throughout Central America as the reality of far reaching structural  changes in global
coffee production and marketing are being recognized.
55.  The current coffee crisis in Central America presents a major challenge  for
improving overall competitiveness  of the countries'  agricultural sectors in the global
economy.  While there are strategies that could be taken by the coffee industry in Central
America to improve on the current situation, these are unlikely to result in a quick
recovery of world prices or farms' profitability.  Non-competitive  coffee producers may
have to switch, partially or totally, to other agricultural or non-agricultural  enterprises for
their livelihoods.  In turn, their laborers and others engaged in directly linked economic
activities will also need to identify alternative livelihoods.
56.  Past attempts by governments  to buffer domestic producers through different
schemes aimed at supporting and/or stabilizing coffee prices are being phased out, and
financial bailouts (for producers receiving credit) are also less forthcoming.  As a result,
producers are more directly exposed to changes in international coffee prices and there
has been increased interest in identifying means to increase and/or stabilize coffee-related
incomes (Giovanucci,  2002).  "Diversification"  is often been mentioned as a solution to
the problems of low and/or fluctuation coffee prices.  However, when the term is loosely
used, it really means that producers  need to "change" their existing activities.  To identify
appropriate strategies it is important to understand the different ways that coffee
producers can "diversify" or "change" their activities to achieve higher and/or more
stable incomes.
57.  There are different ways to increase and stabilize incomes of farmers through
diversification  (see Barghouti, Timmer,  Siegel,  1990; Barghouti,  Garbas, Umali,  1992).
It is possible to diversify within coffee and diversify out of  coffee.  However, to avoid
confusion with the term diversification,  in this paper we will refer to diversification
within coffee as "increased competitiveness" and diversification out of coffee as
"diversification".  Of course, it is also possible for coffee producers to opt for a
diversified  strategy that combines increased  competitiveness  within coffee along with the
introduction of other activities.
58.  An important aspect of strategies aimed at increased competitiveness  and
diversification  is to increase the flexibility of crop and livestock systems and the
allocation of household labor  and capital so that changes in activities, technologies,
1' Relative  to the other Central American countries, coffee and the agricultural sector are less important in
the overall GDP and exports for Costa Rica.21
enterprise mixes,  and financial and marketing arrangements can be undertaken in
response to changing market conditions at relatively low transaction costs (Barghouti,
Timmer, Siegel,  1990; Timmer,  1992).  As Timmer (1992, p.37) notes: increased
competitiveness and diversification are processes of change over time, and not the setting
of specific production  targets.  Raising  (and stabilizing)  incomes of agricultural producers
is (are) the goal(s) - not increasing production statistics.  The processes of increased
competitiveness and diversification need to be demand-driven  because the major
bottleneck is not usually supply constraints.  Instead, the processes of increased
competitiveness  and diversification depend on linked activities in processing and adding
value through quality improvements,  improving financing and marketing arrangements,
and post-harvest practices.  As a process of change over time14, in the short-term  it is
important to exploit the strengths of existing farrning systems and introduce incremental
changes before attempting  to introduce radical far-reaching changes.
59.  A point of clarification needs  to be made between the terms diversification and
specialization.  One of the basic tenets of economic theory is the gains (i.e., increased
returns) achieved through specialization  according to comparative advantage.  However,
specialization (and higher returns)  can lead to higher exposure to risks (e.g., greater
variability of returns).  Thus, there is a potential  risk-return trade-off that might
encourage some diversification and/or the use of some risk management  strategies (see
Siegel and Alwang,  1999, p. 23-41).  Another point of clarification is that costs and
benefits of specialization and diversification need to be considered  at the farm/household
level along with community/regional  and national levels. It is also quite clear that
specializing in a very profitable activity might make economic sense, while diversifying
into activities with low profitability is not such a good choice.  Finally, it is important to
recognize that specialization and diversification  strategies  can have significant  social and
environmental impacts at the different levels. The potential dangers of specializing on
one or a few agricultural commodity crops has long been recognized and efforts to
promote diversification  are not new to Central America or to coffee producers.  Over the
last thirty years,  efforts to promote diversification  at different levels have been made and
have had varying degrees of success in the region.
60.  In this paper, attention is focused on producer  efforts toward increased
competitiveness and diversification (with most of the attention devoted to increasing
competitiveness).  Given the persistent emphasis in this paper about the different types of
producers and types of agro-ecological  conditions in which they are located, it is critical
to acknowledge that there are very different opportunities  and constraints facing different
producers and the economic, social and environmental impacts of their decisions will
differ, too.  And, there will be "winners" and "losers" among different economic agents,
communities  and regions in the respective countries and among the respective countries.
Clearly, this justifies further analyses into issues of increased competitiveness and
diversification that are beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Just as this paper acknowledges the "structural  changes"  taking place in the global coffee market,  it is
critical to acknowledge that responses  to these structural  changes require  a "structural  adjustment process",
that can be "painful".22
A. Increased  Competitiveness- Outlining the Options
Increased competitiveness  can include activities  such as:
1.  Changing how coffee is produced - adoption of improved production
technologies to increase productivity and/or quality of the product.  Also,
improving overall returns from land use through inter-planting with other crops
and livestock.
2.  Changing  business relationships in the financing and marketing of coffee  - using
alternative financing and marketing arrangements including alternative
organizational  structures (e.g., cooperatives,  associations) to lower transactions
costs and to increase  value added received  by producers.  Also,  use of risk
management  instruments to enhance financial  and marketing arrangements.
3.  Changing the form of the final coffee product - adoption of  new and improved
post-harvest technologies for coffee (e.g., processing,  packaging,  storage,
transport) that adds to the net value of coffee for producers.
4.  Identifying alternative uses for coffee - identification of processing technologies
that convert coffee into new "coffee products"  (e.g., iced coffee,  coffee candies
and confectionaries),  eco-tourism based in coffee  growing  areas, or new products
unrelated to coffee per se (e.g.,  using various coffee by-products).
61.  Thus, there are several options for increasing the competitiveness of producers by
changing technologies mixes and marketing/financial  arrangements  and post-harvest
practices.  These options are not easy to carry out, but do have the advantage of allowing
producers to continue "specializing" in coffee production.  In this paper,  attention will be
focused  on different  strategies for increasing  competitiveness  in coffee (Chapter VI) - as
opposed to diversification  (Chapter VII).
B. Diversi ication-Outlining  the Options
62.  Diversification means changing what is produced  on the farm - switching to
alternative crop and livestock enterprises on the farm.  But also, diversification means
changing labor/capital  allocation to off-farm activities  - switching to agricultural  and/or
non-agricultural activities off the farm in the area or through migration (temporary or
permanent).15
63.  Thus,  diversification  includes  any agricultural  activity or practical  combination of
activities not related to coffee production that will generate positive net income on the
farm. For non-competitive coffee producers,  diversification could be a viable alternative
to achieve economic sustainability in the medium to long run. The term "non-
competitive" is used here to describe coffee farms that cannot compete in world markets,
15 Some coffee producers  might even decide on selling or abandoning the farm.23
either because their agroclimatic conditions or cost structure does not allow them to be
profitable when competing in the "commodity"  segment of the market or because they
cannot produce coffees to compete in the "high quality" segment of the market.
64.  The actual strategy selected - either increased competitiveness  of diversification  - to
be pursued in any country will depend on the structure of the coffee sector (e.g., producer
profiles, technologies,  skills mix of agricultural  laborers),  agro-ecological  conditions of
different producers, the public sector's agricultural  support services (e.g.,  research and
extension), transport and communication  infrastructure, the private sector (e.g.,  financial
and marketing sectors) and the regulatory environment,  etc.  It is critical to emphasize  the
dangers of adopting a strategy of "picking the winners" or, equivalently, of "picking the
losers" (see Barghouti, Timmer,  Siegel,  1990).  For example, there has been some
discussion about trying to phase out coffee production  at altitudes under 800 meters, or to
try and promote vegetable and flower production as an alternative to coffee.  It is
important for governments to provide the enabling conditions for producers to make the
"right" decisions, while eliminating distortionary signals and improving the overall
competitive environment for the agricultural  and rural sectors.  This is a critical  message.
65.  One issue to consider is that at this stage it may be difficult to start considering the
possibility of growing alternative crops that require different skills, machinery and
equipment,  support services,  etc.  Instead, part of the strategy should be to identify
alternative markets  for coffee, and consider options for new markets, including
transforming  coffee into higher-value products.  At this point in time it maybe  more
realistic to make incremental changes  in farming and post-harvest practices  (aimed at
increasing productivity and the quality of outputs), and more sophisticated efforts in
marketing  and financial arrangements,  including improved post-harvest processing,
storage and transport technologies and arrangements.
66.  For either improving  competitiveness  in coffee or diversifying  out of coffee, the
public sector can have an important role in providing public goods such as information
(e.g., research and extension) and infrastructure.  The private sector - both domestic and
foreign - should take the lead in identifying opportunities and facilitating the adoption of
appropriate technologies and arranging for financial  and marketing  arrangements.  What
might be needed are match-makers (e.g.,  firms with knowledge of local conditions and
links with domestic and foreign entrepreneurs) who can identify opportunities and help
match private sector firms with producers  and producer groups.
67.  The public sector needs to make sure that macroeconomic conditions and legal
framework are conducive for domestic and foreign firms.  Also,  the public sector needs to
continue investing in transport and communication infrastructure to lower transaction
costs and increase competitiveness.  Some of the investment in transportation and
communication infrastructure  could be coordinated at the community level, along with
investments in infrastructure  for improved water and sanitation,  and improved education
and health as part of a comprehensive  broad-based rural development  strategy.24
VI. STRATEGIES FOR INCREASEDI  COMPETITf  lVENESS
A. Improving Quality, Value Added and Marketing  for Coffee
68.  By adopting a quality orientation that differentiates their coffees, Central American
countries can improve their overall position in international markets through enhanced
reputation and higher differentials relative to the New York Board of Trade "C" contract
that sets the benchmark market price for these coffees.  However,  even with some
improvements  in quality, success is by no means guaranteed.  Many countries struggling
with the low market price that is now intrinsic to their common positions as raw material
suppliers are seeking to advance in the same direction.  Even Brazil,  the world's largest
supplier of coffee  as a commodity, is consistently investing  in improved quality. Any
country strategy must take into account the competitive  direction of the market leaders.
69.  Although  quality may be the sine qua non of Central America's  coffee future,
there are also other ways by which it can differentiate  itself and seek competitive
advantages.  To be able to enter, and develop the emerging higher revenue segments of
the market with differentiated coffees requires the development of value-added  strategies
and marketing that distinguish Central American coffees from those of other parts of the
world.  This will require a serious commitment to invest and move forward quickly in
order to establish an early advantage  over competitors before the field gets crowded.  It
will also require a wide scale sectoral  commitment that includes both government and the
private sector in order to maintain a consistent focus over the years it takes to build a
unique position or "brand" recognition for the country. Before designing such strategies  it
is important to understand the characteristics  and trends of the consuming markets and
where demand is trending.
70.  Currently the differentiated  or specialty markets import roughly 6-8 million bags'6
representing about 7-10% of the developed markets'7 and slightly less of total world
consumption. However these coffees represent a much larger percentage of profits.  In
the U.S. for example the specialty coffee markets accounts for less than 20% of actual
green bean imports but nearly 50% of coffee sector profits. A significant proportion of
Central America's production could potentially access these markets.  Although not all
producers would be capable of participating,  for some producers, especially smaller ones,
the increased income - ranging from 5%  to  100% above market prices - would be
appreciable.  Although at today's prices a producer that can sell certified organic and fair
trade would double his income, these markets are still relatively small and such extra
margins are unlikely to remain at that level for more than a few years.
16 This figure represents  an  estimation of those coffees that are differentiated,  free of noticeable defects,
and perhaps  paid a premium at origin.
"7  Primarily North America,  western Europe,  and Japan  that buy nearly all of  these coffees.25
70.  Finally, an important issue related to improved competitiveness  is the ability of
farmers to deal with price uncertainty.  Ways to reduce price uncertainty could be provide
greater flexibility in marketing of coffee,  improve access to financing and could also
perhaps  contribute to better terms of financing.
A.1  Improving Quality
71.  The structural nature of the coffee crisis, the relatively  high importance  of the sector
in Central America,  and the impact of the crisis in the poverty of hundreds of thousands
of families in the rural areas makes development  of the rural economy the centerpiece  of
strategies to overcome the crisis.  Supporting quality improvements in regions with
potential  is a centerpiece of a strategy to cope with the current crisis. This need to be
supported with appropriate  promotion and marketing,  and effective public policy and
investment instruments, private investment,  and backing  from civil society and NGOs.
72.  A strategy that supports quality improvements  is key for Central America for several
reasons. First and foremost, because of the favorable agro-ecological  conditions of the
Central American  highlands, the region has a comparative advantage  in this segment of
the coffee market.  Second,  consistent quality coffee fetches a price premium.  Third,
improvements in quality can also drive increases in consumption.  Finally, improvements
in competitiveness, such as improving coffee quality, may have positive externalities  in
the agricultural and rural sector.
73.  Improvements  in quality offer other benefits as well.  Increasing quality can help
national coffee  sellers develop and strengthen their long-term relationships with
exporters,  importers, and retailers, and increase their ability to negotiate prices, including
premiums for quality.  This will empower national coffee sellers.  Improving quality can
also help national coffee sellers develop direct links and access to international  markets.
74.  The IDB/WB/USAID (2002) discussion document identified four steps in a strategy
to promote quality coffee  in Central America.  These are:
*  Understanding  and evaluating  the quality of  coffee in terms of its attributes and
market preference;
*  Identifying the key problems that affect quality and its consistency throughout the
entire production chain;
*  Defining the alternatives  for overcoming these problems; and
*  Determining  public  policy and  investment instruments and  private investment that
will facilitate the adoption of such alternatives.
75.  In evaluating quality,  a key issue according to the study is improved education of
farmers and establishment of local cupping laboratories in producing regions.  Physical
evaluation and cupping are procedures performed by coffee importers  on samples that
they receive before shipment. One key element to improving and maintaining quality is
developing the capacity to evaluate coffee with the same standards  as the buyers. In26
addition to this, assuring commercial consistency  in lots and confidence  in delivery, are
essential to developing long-term relationships  with buyers.
76.  According to the same study, improving quality has two main areas:  (a) improving
quality in primary production; and (b) improving quality in coffee milling (beneficio).
77.  The key elements in improving quality in primary production involve:
o  Adequate preparation of coffee before and during harvest.  This involves
appropriate  cultural and harvesting practices to ensure  quality.
o  Incentives  for producing quality coffee in terms of a compensation  system that
recognizes and reward quality differences and effectively transmits price signals
to producers.
o  Improvements  in transportation so deter quality deterioration during transport of
cherries to the wet mills or coffee coming from wet mills.
o  Support of producer organizations  in developing organizational and cooperative
approaches  that will help improve managerial problems and improve quality.  For
example producer organization can disseminate  quality standards and best
practices in coffee farm care and harvest.
o  Support the production of differentiated  coffees by supporting necessary
extension,  training and certification of these coffees.
78.  The key elements  in improving quality in coffee milling include:
o  Investments in appropriate equipment and practices to protect and enhance coffee
quality.
o  Cupping laboratories  and trainiing sessions esLablished at the coffee mills to better
evaluate the quality.
o  Strengthening and business and marketing practices  at the mills so they better
promote quality coffee and transmit rewards to farmers who deliver better
quality.
A.2  Increasing Value-added
79.  For decades,  most countries have passively accepted their role as a supplier of green
beans in world coffee markets.  Meanwhile,  on the demand side of the market, roasters
have  shown a remarkable  capacity to add enormous value  to green beans, by targeting
increasingly segmented  and fragmented consumer markets.  As a result,  multinationals
and firms in consuming nations have captured huge downstream margins. Meanwhile,
producers'  share of total value has declined considerably:  from approximately  30 percent
to less than 10 percent in the last two decades.  To increase their share of total value and
to add value, producers need to simultaneously develop downstream  supply chain
linkages and pursue promotion strategies that feature their coffee's comparative
advantages. Following are some approaches and some cautions for Central American
producers to consider:27
80.  Working with retailers. Certain countries could work directly with retailers.  Indeed,
retailers'  ability to develop private labels and otherwise  bypass the traditional trading
channels  is fast emerging as a critical competitive factor.  Such labels are taking a fast-
increasing share of grocery sales, even at the high-end of the market. Moreover,  they do
not require  costly market entries or direct competition with current buyers. But there are
demanding requirements  in terms of quality, packaging,  and "jut in time" fulfillment that
could be a difficult hurdle.  Thus, only the more organized producer groups and
associations will have the capacity to deal with retailers directly.
81.  Reducing dependence on middlemen. Among the various methods to increase the
overall  share of value added, one of the simplest and most frequently discussed is the
reduction of intermediation---depending  less on the middleman. While this has obvious
appeal, inexperienced  farmers or farmer groups should consider it with caution.
Middlemen,  although often derided, have been shown to perform valuable and sometimes
very cost-effective functions  by providing credit, agglomerating  volume, finding buyers,
and providing transport---all  with considerably  more efficiency and tolerance for risk
than many farmers.  Many producer organizations often do not have the skills, capital, or
dedicated  personnel to take on the market oriented roles of middlemen. Although training
individuals in such organizations  may be helpful in terms of achieving market
transparency it is often a difficult and lengthy process  for them to become  effective at
other market intermediation roles. An alternative could be to combine the resources of
more than one organization into a second-tier or apex group that can then hire the
person(s) with the appropriate skills, dedication, and time available  to conduct those
functions as a formal business.
82.  Capturing  product-oriented  value by marketing  processed or transformed  coffee
(for example, soluble or roast and grind) can require considerable expertise and
investment,  particularly if the target market is overseas.  Process-oriented  value (Organic
or Eco-certification)  can be less costly and in the long run has the distinct advantage of
providing a higher percentage  of benefits and income directly to the producer.  This is
because,  whether a coffee  is roasted domestically or overseas rarely affects the price the
producer receives. Another producer-oriented  way of capturing value is to exploit
Geographic  Indications of Origin (GIO) or appellations  that distinctly connect
quality/value to a particular and specific origin. Often large companies and multinational
are involved  in the transformation and distribution of processed coffee and products and
appropriate  alliances could be one way to go.  Some companies in Central America are
entering the markets for processed coffee products,  such as for example Costa Rica's
Cafe Britt.  Colombia's launch of its soluble coffee and soft drink type of products can
also serve as a useful example of the process and investments necessary for the successful
launch of processed coffee products.
83.  Brand recognition  is a valuable asset in an increasingly competitive  coffee market.
Brands are essentially a symbolic embodiment of reputation. Indeed some countries have
taken great pains to be perceived as a brand.  Colombia is the perfect example and its
logo and trademarks  are widely recognized.  Colombia's achievement was not a simple
one.  It has involved 50 years of coordination at the level of field quality, national policy,28
and consistent promotion.  It has further involved a long-term commitment to
multimillion dollar promotional budgets. But programs  do not need to be so grandiose  in
order to be successful.  Several smaller Central American brands have already achieved  a
measure of market recognition and success.
84.  There are some clear rules and lessons of brand development.  They require long-term
investment and a strong commitment from all of the stakeholders involved in developing
them.  For producers that feature coffees with Geographic  Indications of Origin, this
means a coordinated quality commitment throughout the appellation that is necessarily
born of a strong organizational  structure.  That structure is vital in order to provide
adequate information and technical training to the farmers in that circumscribed  area and
to monitor compliance with the quality requirements  of the appellation or brand.
Government needs to support the mapping and development of adequate geographic
indicators and must also enforce the regulations protecting them.
85.  Appellation-based  brands initially require considerably more work to develop than a
label or logo drawn up by a marketing agency.  For example, appellations require terrain
analysis, stakeholder negotiations, legal definitions and regulations all of which take
patience, resources, and commitment.  However, in the long run, they may also be more
beneficial  to the local farmers who share ownership. Invented labels, unlike a specific
terrain, are easily copied or improved upon and, like fashions, can come and go.
Appellations on the other hand are the property of local owners who can therefore capture
much of the value themselves in this feature, perhaps more than any other, may make
them more sustainable.  Guatemala has already defined seven appellation regions for its
coffees (Antigua being the best known) and this partly explains the premiums it receives.
A.3  Promotional  Strategiesfor  Coffee
86.  Given limited promotional resources and the changing levels of competition,
marketing efforts must be judiciously targeted and professionally developed.  The most
efficient approaches  focus on relationships  such as roaster visits and trade shows, rather
than on untargeted advertising.  Some useful promotional  strategies such as E-Trade and
business development,  internal consumption  campaigns, and Market Information Systems
(MIS), are already being tested and utilized in the coffee trade.
E-trade, auctions, and the "Cup of Excellence" comWetition.
87.  Internet-based  coffee auctions have been tested for two years with some notable
success, albeit on a very limited scale. In the most notable B2B trade to date a Norwegian
firm paid $1  1.00/lb for a small lot of Las Nubes green beans (winner Cup of Excellence,
Guatemala 2001)  and the 2002 Nicaraguan auction brought an even higher price for one
of its coffees. Brazil's e-auction of 54 tons of its better coffees fetched prices as high as
$2.60/lb last year.  Brazil, Colombia,  Guatemala,  Nicaragua,  Panama, and Uganda have
been early leaders in this field that is about to get bigger. Businesses like Comdaq are
providing solution platforms  for developing coffee e-commerce. Experience with the
"Cup of Excellence"  program is the most extensive and it is one template available to29
producing countries that want to encourage quality improvements  and quality recognition
for their coffee producers.
88.  The Cup of Excellence is recognized internationally  as a coffee cupping event that is
designed to identify and promote the best coffees (within a given country) through a
series of blind cupping conducted by national and international judges.  The judges
evaluate every detail of the coffee from aroma, acidity,  to body and balance.  Such
competitions are a testimony that emphasis on coffee quality through improved farm
practices  combined with the installation of model cupping laboratories  can lead to
significant behavioral  changes. Competitions like the Cup of Excellence can improve the
image of a country in international  markets. Three cup of excellence  competitions  have
been conducted so far in Brazil,  Guatemala (2001) and Nicaragua  (2002) with more
countries negotiating to do so in the future.
89.  The Internet can be used for more than just traditional marketing.  The ability to
share new forms of information can expand the possibilities to include support systems
for land use monitoring,  certification,  and Geographic  Indications of Origin (GIOs) or
Appellation.  One pilot program funded by USAID/Peru is successfully testing these
possibilities online.  Their mapping system serves as a prototype  for the SCAA
denomination of origin/marketing partners project.
Market Information Systems.
90.  Information is the lifeblood of efficient agricultural markets. The availability of
accurate price and other market information helps reduce risks and transaction costs and
better enables market participants to plan and coordinate their production and trading
activities. Market information is a public good and offers valid arguments for it to be
jump-started  with public funds. However,  around the world, many efforts to develop
public sector Market Information Systems (MIS) have failed. Most MIS's have lacked
commercial utility and have been unsustainable  (Giovannucci,  1999).  To avoid the most
common factors for failure, four issues must be addressed: (a) funding and training are
needed to ensure private, non-governmental  management;  (b) cost recovery mechanisms
must be devised; (c)  the systems must be established on a modest scale, at least initially;
and (d) a participatory process is needed that is user-defined  and incorporates feedback.
91.  A good example of a sophisticated  MIS is an evolving project that is developing
information on "green"  markets and is operated by Centro de Inteligencia Sobre
Mercados  Sostenibles (CIMS).  It is based in San Jose, Costa Rica under the aegis of
INCAE 8, one of Latin America's  leading academic  institutions. All Central American
countries can use this system and even a more modest coffee-oriented  system could also
be effective.
92.  Organizations  like cooperatives  and trade associations can be excellent  conduits of
specialized market information, particularly if they are trained to manage and disseminate
it. Indeed, this is a significant service they can provide their constituents,  but one that has
proven difficult to manage and sustain without efficient organizations.  Valuable  market
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information  is also passed through market alliances and is another reason to support
integrated supply chain development.
Agro-tourism and Eco-tourisnm
93.  In addition to improved  sustainability,  farmers in some areas could also benefit by
combining  shade-grown  organic coffee production with eco-tourism.  The natural coffee
production areas have been proven to draw increased numbers of birds and wildlife. In
some rural areas, eco-tourism  can be more economically important than agriculture.
Coffee-growing  areas in El Salvador, Mexico,  and Colombia are already associated with
national parks. Indeed El  Salvador recently launched a small National  Park dedicated  to
diversifying coffee production models (particularly eco- friendly) and educating people
about coffee growing.  Their intention is to create a multipurpose tourist haven that
includes recreational  facilities and food outlets.  Furthermore,  a European trend that has
spread to other parts of the world, including Costa Rica, is agro-tourism.  Diversified  and
well-managed  coffee farms lend themselves to this concept and could be prime tourism
destinations.
Increasing  domestic promotion and consumption.
94.  One of the opportunities that emerge from a low price global market is the
development of domestic markets. With adequate stimulus, the results can be very
worthwhile.  A prime example  is Brazil.  It struggled for years with modest per capita
consumption rates.  In the early  1  990s  some of the lower quality coffee that was
commonly  sold throughout the country began to be replaced with smoother and more
flavorful coffee.  Until then, much of the available domestic coffee was sold primarily on
a price basis and often included triage, coffee hulls, and assorted non-coffee fillers.  This
change in product quality was accompanie  by a series of promotional campaigns
directed at various segments of society,  including the young. Domestic consumption
responded dramatically.  Now Brazil has increased its per capita consumption and has
increased  its domestic markets so successfully that it is second only to the United States
among the world's major consumers of coffee.  Brazil's per capita coffee consumption is
at 4.6 kg, compared to 2.3 kg for Colombia and 2.1 kg for Central America  as a;1 average
(but noting that per capita coffee consumption in Costa Rica is as high as 3.7 kg).31
Table 6.1 Central America:  Coffee Consumption
I  1991  |  1995  |1999  2000
Consumption as a percenta ge of Production
Costa Rica  13.6  8  12.4  11  1
El Salvador  8.2  10 4  5.4  8 9
Guatemala  8.6  7 7  5 8  6.4
Honduras  11.1  8.4  5 6  8 6
Nicaragua  19.5  11.3  8 5  13 5
Central America  10.9  8 8  7  8.9
Per capita coffee consump tion in kg/person
Costa  Rica  7.2  3.6  4.6  3.7
El Salvador  2.1  2  9  1 5  1.5
Guatemala  2  1.9  1.6  1 5
Honduras  3.1  17  16  21
Nicaragua  2.1  1.5  1.6  2.6
Central America  2 9  1.9  1 9  2 1
Source: Estimates using data from ICO and CEPAL
95.  Moreover, among the many direct and indirect  participants in the coffee industry,
increased internal consumption of better quality coffee can improve familiarity with the
characteristics of good coffee.  This can arguably help contribute  to improvements  in
production quality.
96.  The good news is that consumption can certainly be improved and there is some
evidence that better quality is associated with higher consumption rates.  Unfortunately
modest attempts to pursue this model in Colombia have not proven to be very successful.
This could be due to Colombia's already relatively high quality of domestic consumption
and that the modest attempts were made during  a period of economic recession and
during a period of high global prices when much of the focus was on moving good coffee
out of the country.
Producer  oriented promotion.
97.  Improved market prices and market access are not the most important basis for
deciding to adopt improved or differentiated  production methods. Indeed, it is vital that
promotional policies focus on the local benefits---rather than the price premium or market
benefits, which may be evanescent.  Organic, Fair Trade,  and eco-friendly coffee can
offer considerable  environmental,  social, and even health benefits to growers and their
communities.  These include:  (a) shade trees, use of organic fertilizers and composting to
help preserve the soil structure, thereby preventing erosion and protecting watersheds; (b)
organic husbandry  supports biodiversity especially  in microbial life that provides natural
control of pests and pathogens; (c) organic methods improve nutrient recycling and
enhance soil quality/fertility;  and (d) soil management and localized input methods
provide very useful risk management especially for poor rural  smallholders.32
A 4. Managing  price risk and  volatility
98.  Coffee farmers face at least two distinct sets of problems associated with prices: the
outright price level,  and volatility.  Historically, coffee prices have been among the most
volatile of all commodity prices. Price volatility was particularly pronounced during the
1  990s, and is expected to continue, together with the downward tendency in coffee
prices. Volatility is the result of an inelastic demand curve and supply shocks, mainly
caused by past production disruptions in Brazil (mainly because of frosts), production
adjustments in response to price increases,  and policy changes (such as the suspension of
the economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreement).
99.  Cyclical price volatility, particularly within the crop season, can be managed through
price  risk  management  instruments.  However,  the  secular  price  trend  requires  other
longer-term  elements,  such  as  diversification  or  improvements  in  quality  and
productivity.
100.  Speculative behavior also needs to be addressed. This was one of the sources of the
banking problem.  In the past, many farmers chose not to fix coffee prices, even after their
crop was exported; rather, they retained speculative futures-linked positions with
exporters. The lack of coverage in a period of decreasing prices led to the reduction in
their ability to repay their loans.
101.  Tools to manage price volatility already exist. However, small and medium-size
agricultural producers in developing  countries are, in general, unable to access them.
Impediments to their use by producers include mappropriate  instruments to suit their
needs, high transaction costs, and little understanding of their use. Additionally,  in the
developed world, many producers  frequently do not access risk management instruments
directly, instead they access them indirectly through processors and traders.  Some options
to manage lower and volatile prices are described  below.
102.  Ways in which coffee producers can get access to risk management markets are the
focus of studies underway in El Salvador  and Nicaragua.  Two key issues are to develop
competent aggregators of risk management instruments, and to examine ways in which
risk management  instruments can help imrpove access to credit. Local aggregators for
demand for risk management instruments  could be producer organizations,  cooperatives,
rural credit institutions, and traders.  Preliminary results indicate that it is critical to
strengthen the capacity of producer organizations  and cooperatives to deal with price
risks and improve their marketing of coffee.  Approaches  being explored are:
o  Linking price insurance  to a loan agreement.  A farmer who borrows with price
insurance should be a better credit risk than one who borrows without it. From the
perspective of the lender, a portfolio of debt that is insured should strengthen the
lending institution.  It should also improve the flow of credit for farmers who agree to
buy price insurance.  This arrangement may be useful to countries  seeking to improve
the flow of credit to coffee (and other agricultural)  sectors.3 3
*  Adopting sales management techniques, such as hedging strategies, for cooperatives
that manage sales on behalf of their members.  These techniques  could have a double
benefit.  They enable a cooperative  to pay a higher initial proportion of the market
value of the coffee  to a producer.  They also protect the ability of the cooperative to
make payments in the future.
*  Using inventory management. Cooperatives  and other producer organizations may not
wish to sell all their coffee immediately after harvest.  This way, they can spread their
sales more evenly throughout the crop year and take advantage of price rises later on.
This provides a level of flexibility in selling.  Price risk management could  allow
producers to protect the value of their inventories from unexpected price  declines
during the crop year.
*  Aggregating quantities  for hedging, so even farmers with a relatively small quantity
of a commodity can enter into purchase contracts.  Processors, traders  and
cooperatives  can play a useful role in this regard.  Tools like this have arisen in
developed countries,  along with sophisticated  purchasing contracts that have risk
management tools embedded in them. Entities able to provide this type of purchasing
arrangement rarely exist in the developing world. The potential for developing them
needs to be discussed.
*  Using  guarantee  contracts. There are arrangements  in place between farmer
organizations and users that provide  price protection to these farmers;  Fair Trade is
one of them.  Fair Trade guarantees  a price  to farmers that is not only higher (around
$1.20 - to $1.30 per lb., when prices are $0.50 to $0.60 per lb.) but also fixed.  This is
another effective way to provide price protection to coffee producers.
103.  Programs  should be linked to technical assistance packages designed to assist
farmers in understanding the role and operation of forward  and physical markets, as well
as the positive impact of price risk management instruments.  The World Bank is
currently working in two pilot projects in El Salvador and Nicaragua which examine
ways in which coffee producers can get access to price risk management markets. Two
basic ideas are being explored. Firstly, working with cooperatives  that manage sales on
behalf of their members  - sometimes in conjunction with offering to buy the coffee  at a
minimum price from the producers  - to develop sales and hedging strategies designed to
reduce the risk in their activities,  and a second approach which is to attach price
insurance to a loan agreement.
104.  In the first case, the adoption of risk management techniques  enables a cooperative
to pay a higher proportion of the market value of the coffee to a producer whilst
protecting its ability to make subsequent payments. In the second case, the a farmer who
borrows with insurance should be a better credit than one who borrows without it. From a
lenders perspective,  a portfolio of debt that is insured should strengthen the institution,
but it should also lead to a situation where farmers who agree to buy insurance  should
have better access to credit.34
105.  In addition to price risk, there are other risk related to coffee production.  These
include:
Weather risk management. Weather often has an impact on coffee yields.  Recent
developments in weather-based  insurance  could allow producers to obtain protection
against severe weather events such as hurricanes,  mud slides, excess rain,  or drought.
Weather-based index insurance is based on the occurrence  of a certain event that can
measured and verified independently.  This lowers administrative costs and reduces the
usual of moral hazard and adverse  selection problems often associated with traditional
crop insurance (see  Skees et.  al., 2002).
Risk management and environmental sustainability. Sustainable production methods
incorporating  soil management and localized input methods can also provide useful risk
management  support, especially for poor rural smallholders.  These methods  diminish
costly dependence  on agrochemicals,  reduce the impacts of drought, and encourage  on-
farm diversification for food security and income protection.
B.  Parameters  for Successful Development of Coffee Initiatives in Central  America
106.  Many successful coffee initiatives have three things in common.  They achieve a
measure of market success,  empower farmers  to reduce poverty levels, and do so while
enhancing rural natural resource management.  They also share a process-oriented
approach that is somewhat innovative  for rural projects. Recent  experience in coffee
related projects sheds light on viable best practices  as well as significant cost and
management  issues that can be applied to new initiatives. The World  Bank has managed
four GEF financed coffee projects in Uganda, El Salvador,  Mexico, and Nicaragua.  In
addition to these projects The World Bank Group has supported innovative  financing
mechanisms  for the shift to ecologically friendly production methods and is now
developing a carbon sequestration project could in the long-term provide  substantial
incentives for smallholder participation in eco-friendly  coffee growing (see chapter IX
for details). Other donor or government  funded initiatives  in Costa Rica (organic  cacao
CIMS, government coffee certification),  El Salvador (coffee  cluster and GTZ programs),
Mexico (various), and Nicaragua  (USAID cupping labs and Competitiveness Learning
and  Innovation Loan) have also contributed useful lessons about what works and what
doesn't.
107.  Three main characteristics  distinguish the more successful  initiatives:  market
orientation,  organizational development,  and environmental  awareness.
Market Orientation.
108.  Although this is an obvious feature to most project designers,  it is rarely well-
designed.  While some projects include provisions for marketing, they rarely include the
appropriate expertise to guide the a) market development,  b) planning, and c) execution.
One of the most successful shortcuts in this category is the integration of private sector
coffee buyers.35
Organizational Development.
109.  The unit costs of reaching producers  directly are simply prohibitive  and therefore
credible and representative  organizations are needed to lower transaction costs. There are
examples  of projects that have created producer  organizations  for the purpose of the
project and these tend to not survive.  The quality and capacity of local organizations  and
associations is a critical factor in the success of any project.  Unfortunately,  most
producer organizations  are inadequately assessed for their capacity to participate
effectively.  As a result,  projects are stalled, monitoring costs skyrocket, and shortcuts
are eventually cobbled together in order to get by and proceed.  There  are probably only a
handful of Central American cooperatives that require no institutional support and
training in order to be effective partners.  Therefore, projects must incorporate
institutional  support in the form of:  a) improving management capacity;  b) initiating or
strengthening  internal accounting systems;  c) strengthening democratic process through
representativeness,  information flow, and formal legitimacy.
Environmental Awareness.
1  10.  In a region where agriculture is recognized as the number one threat to biodiversity,
coffee represents  one of the easiest ways to combine agricultural gains with
environmental  gains. Indeed,  the market is rewarding environmentally friendly processes
such as organic production.  Unfortunately,  a plethora of environmental  seals,
certification agencies, and marketing claims can be confusing. Choosing and managing
the appropriate certification processes become  important factors for success.  It is also
important to understand both the upfront costs and the ongoing maintenance costs and
requirements.  Often, certification  is necessary to provide the market incentive that
ensures growers  continue to follow tnz prescribed guidelines.  While certification may be
the starting hook that ensures the farmer's adherence  to environmental principles there is
early evidence of a more sustainable method.  Involving the farmer  in an interactive
educational  process about the real and localized benefits of sound natural  resource
stewardship may well be a better long-term investment.
C. CentralAmerican Supply  in Relation to the Differentiated Markets
111.  Central American countries have long ago staked out a different competitive  arena.
A differentiation strategy has worked particularly well for Guatemala that exports about
half of its production  as a differentiated non-commodity  product. Costa Rica
differentiates about 40% of its exports . Both are capable of expanding this percentage.
While it would take a number of years for the other countries to reach similar proportions
of their production  as differentiated  coffees, several have significant potential.
Costa Rica
1  12.  Costa Rica has achieved a distinct market perception of being eco-friendly and this
can be a considerable  advantage,  especially if it is leveraged to include other agricultural
products.  Its reputation is so well-established  that it can be surprising to note that the
percentage of certified organic or eco-friendly agricultural products that it exports is
actually quite small.  On the other hand, many of its processors  already use relatively
clean technology.  ICAFE is attempting  to introduce a law that will permit processors to36
more effectively differentiate  and help reward the quality of the coffee they receive.  The
previous government  had also announced a "sustainable"  coffee seal that would be
granted  to eco-friendly  growers that parallel some of the guidelines outlined in Starbucks'
Preferred  Supplier Program.
113.  Costa Rica has a high percentage  of quality coffee production approximately  43%
of which is sold in the gourmet channels.  It has already established considerable
credibility in the gourmet market with brands like La Minita and appellations  like
Tarrazu.  Although it is one of the few exporters of organic chocolates,  it exports
relatively little organic coffee,  no certified  eco-friendly  coffee, and  16,000 bags of fair
trade coffee that represents about 1% of its total exports. It has registered  capacity to
export more than 41,000 bags of fair trade coffee.  There are obvious advantages  for Costa
Rica to pursue high-quality  gourmet coffee as well as fair trade, organic,  and eco-friendly
certifications.
El Salvadoor
114.  El Salvador bears the dubious distinction of being the most deforested  country in
the region with less than 10% of its original  forest cover remaining.  The great majority
of this remaining forest is either part of or contiguous to coffee farms.  Therefore,
maintaining these coffee farmers  is almost synonymous with maintaining the country's
remaining scarce forests.  A GEF financed project by focusing on this issue has managed
to not only sensitize the country to its dilemma but also impact national coffee policy to
include more eco-friendly options such as the Rainforest Alliance certification that the
project piloted.  It's eco-friendly certification project has given some of its coffees a first
mover advantage  into the U.S., Japanese,  and raiwanese markets.  Unfortunately these
quantities are small (1000-2000  bags) and still  show only modest growth as market
acceptance is limited.
115.  Only about 5% of its coffee crop is differentiated  production destined for the
specialty market with the majority  flowing into common commodity channels.  For
several  years the country has promoted its high-quality  gourmet offerings and even
developed an appellation and an umbrella brand (Itzalco).  At least 11,000 bags of its
production are immediately certifiable  as organic and exported 4,600 bags  in 2001.
Although it has the capacity to export approximately  12,000 bags of fair trade coffee  it
has not done so in recent years reportedly due to low quality issues.  Although there was
a report of 6000 bags exported at fair trade prices in 2001, these were not officially
registered.
Guatemala
116.  It's notable advances in quality and promotion have been well recognized with price
premiums that are consistently higher than most other origins;  for example April 2002
averages  are more than 5% over Colombian spot prices.  Approximately 40-50% of its
exports  are destined for differentiated  market channels.  It promotes  7 distinctly regional
coffees and several differentiated  subcategories.  Guatemala  also participated  in a small
Internet auction that yielded world-record prices for one producer.  It exported more than
10,000  bags of organic coffee in 2000  and has at least 35,000 bags of production that are37
immediately  certifiable as organic. Among its exports that year 22,000 bags were to the
fair trade market (some of these also organic).  Its estimated 2001  fair trade production
capacity is 60,000  bags.  It also had approximately 23,000 bags of certified eco-friendly
coffee although it is not clear just how much of this was exported as such.  It leads all
other Central American producers in sustainable coffee exports.  These currently
represent less than 2% of its total exports.
Honduras
117.  Less than  15% of Honduran production is differentiated from its bulk commodity
coffee production.  Its older varietals, microclimates, and traditional production methods
give it plenty of room for improvement.  Although there is an emerging appreciation of
quality-oriented  cultivation methods,  these are far from common.  Post harvest
management and processing are also weak and altogether these factors  serve to castigate
the market price for Honduran coffee.
118.  It is estimated that less than half of coffee producers use regular fertilization or
agrochemicals.  In some parts of the country small-scale  organic projects have been
operational for several years and at least 5000 bags are immediately certifiable as
organic.  For 2001  its estimated fair trade production capacity was 51,000 bags.  8000
bags were exported in 2000.  Its organic and fair trade exports probably totaled less than
11,000 bags in 2000.
Nicaragua
119.  About 10% of its exports are currently destined for the differentiated markets yet
many experts estimate that it has enormous potential. Quality has improved in recent
years and some producers have developed a reputation in the gourmet market. Their six
year old Specialty Coffee Association of Nicaragua has developed an affiliation with the
SCAA to promote quality.  Some of the higher growing regions have considerable
unfulfilled potential. More than 10,000 bags of its production were exported as certified
organic in the year 2000.  In the same year 24,000 bags were exported as fair trade
certified.  Its 2001  capacity for fair trade is approximately 135,000 bags or  11  % of total
production.
120.  Nicaragua has a number of small-scale development projects including the USAID
funded quality improvement project to install quality control and cupping  labs in rural
areas, and a cooperative  development project. In late May 2002 it was the third country to
hold a competition  for best coffee,  like the cup of excellence,  and in July 2002 it held an
auction for its best coffees that fetched very high prices.  Its production systems feature
some of the lowest shade tree counts in the region.  A recent GEF project attempted to
address part of the deforestation issue by introducing solar coffee dryers to prevent the
tree cutting that was occurring  to feed the energy intensive wood-fired coffee dryers.  In
one reserve alone (BOSAWAS)  200 hectares of forest were being cleared  daily for
timber and agricultural production.  Other key development programs in the coffee sector
are financed  by Sweden, Finland, and Norway directed to improve the micro-credit
system, avoid the contamination of the watersheds, and educate the producers about
Integrated Pest Management  practices respectively.38
VII.  DIVERSIIFICATIf  ON STRATEG1ES
A. Elements oLa Diversification  Strate,
121.  In Section V, an overview of general issues relevant to increased competitiveness
and diversification were  presented.  A goal of diversification  is to provide alternatives  for
those coffee producers who will not be competitive  in producing coffee---alternatives  that
will allow them to keep the farm as an agricultural enterprise,  or even include some non-
agricultural activities,  and/or off-farm  activities.  Alternatives - especially those
supported by public funds - should also consider enterprises that provide employment
opportunities  for displaced coffee labor, and that promote land (and other natural
resources, e.g., water) use practices and patterns that are environmentally  sustainable.
122.  In addition, non-agricultural  economic activities should be promoted  in the rural
sector for coffee producers,  laborers and others. Some ideas include light industry,
adventure tourism, social  services (health, education, transportation),  and technical
training (mechanical,  woodcraft, plumbing).  Another diversification  strategy is migration
out of the area, to another rural area, an urban area, or out of the country is.  Migration
and the receiving of remittances from migrants has become  a major reality  of rural
economies  in most of the five Central American countries.
123.  It should be emphasized that diversification  can have potential positive  benefits,
however only some have been proveni i; practice and some remain subjective perceptions
(Tabora,  1992, p.100). Potential benefits include:  a) broadening and expanding the base
of economic activity,  b) counterbalancing  fluctuations  in free market economies,  c)
enhancing resource utilization;  d) developing a competitive  setting among different
sectors that can increase efficiency,  e) expanding the employment opportunities  in the
rural  economy, and e) enrich entrepreneurial  opportunities  for business generation.  A
diversification  program that also attempts to be poverty-reducing  needs to be tailored to
this specific  objective.  More thought needs to be devoted  ex ante to identifying expected
beneficiaries,  along with potential losers and/or excluded  groups.
What is a "Successfuli"  Divensfcation Program?
As mentioned  in Chapter V, the objective  of diversification  is increasing  and/or
stabilizing  the  incomes  of farmers,  not  increasing  production  statistics  or just
changing the mix of production.  Besides the farmer  income,  diversification  can
impact laborers'  incomes and environmental  quality.  Also,  there will be impacts
at  the  regional  and  national  as  diversification  takes  place.  Thus,  to  identify
successful  models of diversification,  it is important  to specify  the objectives  of
the program, including expected  beneficiaries,  and to have  appropriate indicators
to monitor the results.  More attention needs  to be devoted  to these issues as the
Central American countries explore  alternative diversification  strategies.39
124.  Clearly, some of these potential  benefits go well beyond the profit objectives  of
individual  farmers, and thereby achieving these benefits justifies some public sector
support.  However, a diversification program  for coffee growing areas should start by
addressing particular farmer objectives such as, increased and/or more stable income and
improved food security.  A diversification  program should help producers  assess the
following issues:
*  Location: agro-ecological conditions, proximity to transport/communication
infrastructure  and markets;
*  Potential markets for different possible crops;
*  Financial needs and available sources of funds;
*  Risk management capacity  and available instruments;
*  Barriers to entry (investment costs, infrastructure requirements);
*  Necessary skills and resources  (information, technical capacity,  financing);
*  Environmental and economic advantages  for production; and
*  Challenges pertaining  to commercialization (logistics,  quality, quantity).
B. Aaricultural  Diversification  in Central  America
125.  Diversification out of coffee is not a new concept or strategy for many Central
American  countries.  In a World Bank publication  on "Trends  in Agricultural
Diversification:  Regional Perspectives"  (see Barghouti,  Garbus, Umali,  1992) there is a
chapter on the experiences  in Central and South America (see  Tabora,  1992).  For
example,  in response to the price decline in the early 1980s, Costa Rica looked into other
crops such as macadamia,  flowers and forestry as alternatives to coffee.  El Salvador has
initiated a program to promote the production of fruits (Programa Nacional  de Frutas) as
an alternative to coffee for areas between 600 and 800 meters.  In 2001, IICA has
produced a study  analyzing the appropriate conditions (agro-climatic,  soil, technology,
markets, etc.) for growing fruits.  In Guatemala, the Ministry of Agriculture and the
association of exporters for non-traditional products  (AGEXPRONT)  did a study in 2000
to identify crops that could substitute coffee in lower areas.  AGEXPRONT  is
formulating a strategy and concrete projects to move forward.  Furthermore, there is the
forestry incentives program (Programa de Incentivos  Forestales,  or PINFOR)  by the
national  institute of forestry (Instituto Nacional  de Bosques, INAB) to assist financially
producers who wish to diversify into forestry.
126.  In the Tabora (1992) review of agricultural diversification  experiences in Costa
Rica, El Salvador,  Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua  (along with Chile and Colombia) it
was found that different countries took different paths, and have had varying degrees of
"success".  Some of the major issues and lessons learned:
1)  Technology Development versus Technology Transfer  - New agricultural
enterprises need to be tested for adoption, cultural management,  post-harvest
handling, packaging,  storage, etc.  and require site-specific technologies  and
techniques.  Should governments  support domestic research and extension or40
depend on international research centers or foreign companies for this expertise?
Different models have been applied (and mixed approaches),  with varying
degrees of success and failure.  Success or failure depend on the specific
agricultural enterprise, domestic research and extension capacity (both public and
private),  and other factors.
2)  Public  versus Private  Investments - Both are needed, but might be targeted
differently.  Many foreign-owned  companies helped expand the production and
export of non-traditional vegetables, ornamentals,  fruits.  However, it was found
that there were few alternatives that were more profitable or with such extensive
and accessible markets as the traditional  commodities that were to be replaced.
What are the public versus private sector objectives of diversification?  Are there
incentives for the private sector help poor small farmers and laborers?
3)  Infrastructure  Development - substantial crop diversification has occurred near
urban areas and in areas close to major export-fanning  activities (e.g., coffee
farms).  Export production areas for major vegetables, ornamentals, and root
crops were often located in the proximity of capital cities (and/or ports). This
illustrates how integration with pre-established  services and facilities, can be
more readily tapped without the additional burden of new investment.  Also, it
points to a potential bias against more remote rural areas and less commercialized
farmers (which is the case for many coffee producers).
4)  Insufficient Expertise - Even if  the technology is available and appropriate and all
the facilities and support services in place, there is still a need for human capital
for managers  and laborers in terms of skills mix and entrepreneurial  capacity.
The lack of human capital has been a major constraint,  and clearly places the
lower educated small farmers at a disadvantage.
5)  Difficulties with the Export Market - Export marketing is more complex than
marketing domestically in terms of language,  logistics, timeliness and technical,
business and cultural perspectives of doing business.  This has complicated  export
expansion and is a bias in favor of larger more commercially oriented farmers,
who might have experience  with export markets.
6)  Inadequate Financial  Incentives - New agricultural enterprises  often require
longer development periods, new facilities, and a trial period before becoming
viable.  This requires longer term financing and appropriate repayment rates.
Also, there is a need to make sure that sufficient funds are available  with
appropriate terms for different types of farmers and farmer associations.
7)  Sustainability  ofDiversification  Initiatives - There  is a need for sustained
diversification efforts, not just as short-term responses to crises.  Successful
sustained efforts have been directed by the private sector, though always fully
supported in many ways by governments, even as political administrations
changed.  Diversification  is a process not an emergency responses.
Tabora (1992, p.102-3) concludes:
127.  "Diversification  is really a leap of faith for many investors in non-traditionals.  This
leap can be cushioned with a supportive government or a large private sector program,
which can provide expertise, physical resources, and other facilities to nurture infant41
projects...  While the private sector possesses the resources to pursue agribusinesses for
diversification, the government  can be a major supporter in developing favorable
policies.  New commodities may need special incentives and may require special
privileges normal to infant industries.  Additionally,  because new commodities involve
foreign - as well as local - investors who could bring technology, financing,  and markets,
governments  will have to provide an attractive  {business}  climate p. 102-103)."
Agricultural Diversification  Programs and Poverty Reduction
Experience  in Central  America  and  elsewhere  in the  world  provide  some  limited  examples  of
agricultural  diversification  programs  that  have  contributed  to  poverty  reduction - at  least for
selected  groups of households.  There was  a diversification  program in Guatemala in the  1980s
that provided incentives  for small farmers to shift from low value  maize production  for home and
domestic  consumption to snowpeas  for export markets.  The Guatemalan  experience  with export
of snowpeas shows that  farmers received  higher incomes  growing snowpeas than maize,  and that
there  was  more employment  for  household  members and  the community.  The  higher  incomes
led  to increases  in household  caloric  intake and improved  childrens'  health and nutritional status.
In addition,  using a crop  rotation of snowpeas  and maize  was beneficial  for soil  fertility.  The
largest  effect,  however,  was  found  to  be  farmers'  confidence,  as  they  became  more
entrepreneurial  and more willing to take risks.
Tabora  (1992,  p.103-104)  concludes:  "A  successful  diversification  program  is  dependent  on
several  factors,  but early  integration of efforts  and long-term  commitment  are key to advancing
technology  and  expertise,  human  resource  and  enterprise  development,  infrastructure,  and
foreign  investments.  Diversification  into high-value  crops can  improve  family incomes,  health,
and quality of life, but real-wage increases  are still elusive."
C. Opportunities  and Constraints to Diversification
128.  There are many potential opportunities for diversification,  and many constraints  for
the respective Central American countries.  And, clearly they differ by country, regions
within countries, and by types of producers within countries.  This message comes out
loud and clear in a very informative  and detailed report recently completed for USAID
entitled "Diversification Options for Coffee  Growing Regions in Central America (see
Chemonics,  2002)."  There are potential opportunities  in both domestic and export
markets for a wide range of horticultural  crops, agro-forestry,  livestock, etc.
129.  It is not the objective of this paper to outline the many options for diversification
that exist - some of which have already been realized - but to point out the constraints
that exist, and to highlight some of the lessons learned from past efforts  in diversification.
There are no easy strategies and options.
Lots of, but Limited Options
In the preface to the Chemonics (2002,  p.4) report it states: "It is not possible  to discuss
all  the  alternatives  but we  may  discuss  the  conditions  that will  limit  choices:  goats,
cattle,  sheep are not appropriate for steep slopes, watersheds  or forest settings.  Altitude
and climate preclude some crops: cocoa,  melons, sugarcane; the market precludes others
such as asparagus."42
130.  Some of the constraints highlighted in the USAID-funded report (Chemonics,  2002)
in the respective  countries  (which were significantly less in Costa Rica) include:
o  Difficult terrains and low soil fertility;
o  Lack of available water and/or electricity for irrigation;
o  Uncertain and/or contested land rights and tenure arrangements;
o  Financial crisis that constrains and or results in high costs of lending for
agriculture  and rural enterprises;
o  Poorly developed rural transport, communication  and energy infrastructure;
o  Lack of developed port and airport facilities;
o  Low literacy and skills levels of rural population; and
o  Underfunded and understaffed research and extension  systems lacking appropriate
skills.
131.  Clearly, not all of these constraints can be removed immediately.  But, they need to
be dealt with, especially if the diversification strategy is to include poverty reduction as
one of its major objectives.  In contrast, larger more commercially oriented farmers can
sometimes circumvent some of these constraints by tapping into their own resources and
connections.
D. Some Possible Government-backed Initiatives  for Diversification
132.  Development of diversification  strategy should follow a systematic approach,
dealing with both the agricultural and business environment constraints at the same time.
As such, it is clear that there is considerable  overlap between efforts to promote
diversification  and increased competitiveness.  What is really needed in the Central
America countries is a broad based rural development  strategy that promotes both
increased competitiveness  and diversification and provides a safety net for poor
individuals and households to help them through this adjustment process.  In analyzing
the elements that have combined to strengthen agricultural  and rural sectors in developed
nations, several factors  stand out:
o  Market research. Solid research is needed to identify markets and study demand
for agricultural products in short supply, whether for domestic or export markets.
Specialized organizations  are often well suited to this task. An example  is
INCAE's new Centro de Inteligencia  Sobre Mercados  Sostenibles (CIMS).
o  Technical assistance. Appropriate  integrated technical packages must be designed
for products  deemed promising  (to address the agronomic,  environmental,
sanitary and phyto-sanitary problems,  and quality requirements  the farmer may
face). This can be accomplished by a variety of partners,  both governmental  and
non-governmental,  in partnership  with the private sector.  Technical assistance
could be offered through extension services managed  and funded by local
authorities, thereby ensuring their active participation.43
Agricultural  safety standards. The underpinning  principles of an agricultural
trade prograrn must be built upon scientifically based sanitary (animal  and human
health) and phytosanitary  (plant health) measures. Accordingly, it is essential for
any program that supports trade in agricultural products to incorporate the
principles set forth in the internationally recognized measures (or regulations) to
protect human, animal or plant life or health: notably, the World Trade
Organization Agreements on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures  and the Technical Barriers to Trade. The WTO  signatories believe that
trading rules based upon science and transparency will promote fair competition
and provide predictable and growing access to markets.
*  Marketing and logistics.  To facilitate the efficient commercialization  of
agricultural products, bottlenecks must be identified  and solutions proposed and
implemented.  One arrangement that has considerable  potential for raising
incomes of small farmers is contract farming.  Processors provide growers  with
credit and technical assistance,  in exchange  for delivery of a crop at a fixed price
at the time of harvest.
*  Improved access to international  markets. Governments in Central America need
to work together to lower and eliminate trade barriers between the respective
countries and also with large foreign markets such as the United States, Europe
and Japan.  There are still important constraints to free trade in agricultural
products  and/or subsidies (direct or indirect) on certain agricultural products that
are a major constraint to diversification.
*  Improved access to labor markets:  labor mobility is important, both within
countries and between countries.  Seasonal and permanent migration, and the
sending of remittances are an important component of the rural economy in the
Central American countries.  Lower barriers  to labor mobility, along with
improved access to financial  services to transfer remittances are therefore
important.
*  Credit support.  Targeted support programs can finance the investments needed to
begin production.  Some modest scheme  may be necessary to support the
individual producer's  income temporarily during the unproductive phase.
However,  such support should be minimized and should not unduly distort the
necessary market-oriented  rationale for diversifying.
*  Community organizations. Locally based groups can support producer and/or
trade organizations.  These groups could gradually take over the processes
discussed above and provide necessary  linkages to markets.44
133.  Unfortunately, all these forms of support may not be in place or may not fall into
place at the same time. The more factors that are present at a given moment, the greater
the chances for  successful broad-based agricultural  diversification. Addressing one
factor at a time will not move diversification along as fast as it needs to move to keep up
with the dynamic trends and requirements  of the domestic and international  markets for
agricultural products (and non-agricultural  and services).
134.  Aside from socioeconomic factors, there are cultural factors to be considered as
well. It may be difficult to convince  coffee producers to produce  something else.
Generally speaking, producers have a long tradition of coffee production, which may be
difficult to overcome. Any diversification  strategy must consider this sort of resistance,
and other such cultural  aspects, when designing programs---especially  for areas that
cannot produce coffee competitively.
135.  Not every farmer can be assisted with a non-coffee agricultural alternative.  Other
alternatives need to be considered for marginal farmers or those beyond the means of an
agricultural solution. Those who face any or all of the following constraints:  The slope of
the land is too steep,  or the soil is too thin and non-fertile.  The farm size is too small, or
the farm is too remote. There is not enough rain for rain-fed agriculture and no water for
irrigation.  These producers may need to find employment  in light industry associated
with non-agricultural  activities. All of these activities would require manufacturing  in the
production area or nearby, offering employment alternatives  for displaced growers.  Such
a manufacturing base requires skilled labor. That labor should be trained, so it is ready to
work once the industry is established.
136.  Finally, rural development programs will not be equitable or successful if they do
not include  farm laborers, especially migratory and seasonal workers---perhaps the most
neglected and disenfranchised  sector in the region.  In fact, smallholders, no matter how
poor, have  more options and support than the landless poor who work seasonally on the
farms of others.  It is important for the respective countries to consider different types of
safety net programs that can provide assistance to poor individuals and households who
have difficulty adjusting to the new situation.
137.  To conclude, diversification is part of a process of transformation of the rural
economy.  There have been many lessons learned from the past (see the following box),
but each country, region, community, and farmer needs to assess present (and future)
conditions and their relative  comparative advantage.  More attention needs to be devoted
to the objectives of a diversification  strategy and to assessing the economic,  social, and
their environmental impacts.  Because of the major economic and political changes that
have taken place in the Central American countries in the 1  990s, there is a need to once
again revisit the issue of diversification, to develop  some best practices  that can be
applied on a case-by-case basis.'45
Lessons Learned from Previous Agricultural  Diversification  Efforts
1.  Improved  quality of output is no less  important than  increases  in quantity of output---and  possibly
more so.
2.  Achieving  quality-based competitiveness  takes time.  This process  is greatly aided  by partnerships
and  match-making  arrangements  with  the  private  sector  (including  foreign  firms).  National
institutions  can  offer  support  to  farmers  in  the  form  of  appropriate  technologies,  technical
assistance,  and financial  and marketing services.
3.  Experience  in  marketing  new  agricultural  products  domestically  is  often  the  first  step  in  the
successful  development of export marketing.
4.  Governments  can support  diversification  by facilitating  foreign  and joint venture  investments,  as
well as transfers of production and processing technologies  from abroad.
5.  Successful  diversification  programs  that  support  sustained  production  and  export  expansion
include  new  types  of financial  and  marketing  arrangements  (such  as  joint  ventures,  vertical
integration,  and  investment  incentive  programs).  Public  investments  are  also  needed  in  human
capital  and  support  structures  (education  and  health,  water  and  sanitation,  rural  infrastructure,
research and extension).
6.  Successful  diversification  programs  start by considering the agro-ecological  characteristics  of the
areas to be diversified. Extensive  market research and marketing planning of potentially successful
crops are  also needed before  any crops are chosen
7.  One of the more  successful approaches  in diversifying  agricultural  capacity has been  to add  value
to  a  crop  that  is  familiar:  one  that  has  already  been  grown  in  the  area  and  whose  agricultural
practices and  post-harvest  handling requirements  are  known to  local  producers.  Adding value  to
the product may make it commercially  successful,  while  increasing  farmers'  incomes.
8.  Production,  financing,  processing,  and marketing  should be left primarily to the private sector.
9.  Farmers cannot assume  all risks involved in the new crops. Government  should provide incentives
should exist for collaborative  research/analysis, technical  and marketing  assistance,  and to finance
the setting up of production---but  not for the production  itself
10.  The  public  sector  should  focus  its  efforts  on  providing  transportation  and  communications
infrastructure,  marketing  infrastructure  (such  as  auction/terminal  markets  and  cold  storage),
standards  and quality control  services  (such  as  product and  factory  inspection  and  certification),
market information services, and new product market and trade promotion assistance.
11.  Strong  institutional  capacity  within  cooperatives  is  crucial  to  the  success  of a  diversification
program.  In  general,  private  agribusiness  firms  have  been  more  successful  than  cooperatives
diversifying  their production.  The  limited  success  of "campesino"  farmer  cooperatives  could  be
attributed  to  a lack  of flexibility,  sophistication,  and  quick  response,  as  well  as  excessive  costs.
When working  with a perishable  product, quick  response  is needed to correct  problems  and react
to  changes  in  the  market.  Cooperatives  must  arrive  at  consensus  before  responding  to  change,
whereas  individual entrepreneurs might only need to make  up their own minds.
12.  Diversification  initiatives  have  faced  critical  and  sometimes  insurmountable  issues  of
sustainability  at  the  farmer  level.  Farmer-centered  research  and  extension  is  important  for  the
adoption of appropriate  sustainable farming  methods by small  farmers.
13.  The  correct  macroeconomic  policy  environment  is  crucial  for  the  sustainability  of the  entire
diversification  program.
14.  Where  diversification  programs were successful  in  increasing  agricultural  exports,  they were also
successful in attracting foreign  investment to the countries'  agricultural and food sectors.
See  Barghouti,  Garbus, Umali (1992); Jaffee  (1993); Chemonics  (2002).46
VIII. THE SOCIAL I5MPACT  OF THUE COFFEE CRISIS
A.  Overview ofEmplovment in the Coffee Sector
138.  There are many people who derive at least some part of their employment and
income from coffee production.  According to a recent report by ECLAC'9 (2002) there
are over 1.6 million people in rural areas of Central America that derive employment and
income from coffee.  The traditional focus of attention in the coffee sector during a time
of crisis is coffee producers and financial  institutions that lend to coffee producers,
traders and exporters.  Notably the focus has been on coffee  producers with outstanding
loans that typically are medium and larger producers.  However,  in the current coffee
crisis there has been increased awareness of the widespread negative  impacts on small
coffee producers and coffee laborers - both full-time and seasonal - and others linked to
activities in the coffee sector and to coffee-related  incomes and expenditures (e.g.,
commerce, transportation, storage and processing, financial services, and retail sales).
Typology of Coffee Producers
139.  In the five Central American countries there are about 300,000 coffee producers, of
which 200,000 are considered "micro producers".  Although they account for almost 70%
of the producers they produce only 11.6% of the coffee.  These micro coffee producers
tend to use traditional varieties and technology, family labor, no purchased inputs, obtain
low yields, grow other crops - often intercropped  with coffee  - especially staple food
crops, and many work as seasonal (and some as full-time) laborers on larger coffee farms
and/or other farms.  "Small producers"  account for almost 50,000 of the nearly 300,000
coffee producers, and they produce more coffee than the 200,000 "micro producers".
Many of the small coffee producers use some improved varieties and technology, use
some hired labor and inputs and might have access to credit through a cooperative.  They
also tend to have other sources of farm based income and possibly some off-farm
employment.  "Medium producers" tend to be technified,  using purchased inputs  and
hired labor, and many have access to credit.  A major proportion of income comes from
coffee.  Medium-large  and large coffee producers  account for about 3.5%  of the
producers and almost 60% of coffee production.  These producers account for the
majority of purchased inputs and hired labor used in coffee production and harvest.  Most
have access to formal credit and many are vertically integrated with coffee processing
and marketing.
'9  Economic Commission  for Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC  or CEPAL for its Spanish name).47
Table 8.1: Tvpolo2v  of Producers in CentralAmerica
Micro  Small  Medium  Medium-  Large  Total
Large
Farm  < 3.5 ha  3.5-13ha  14-34 ha  35-70 ha  > 70 ha
Size
# of  200,000  47,900  33,000  7,300  2,900  291,000
Producers
Total  162,000ha  170,OOOha  126,000ha  133,OOOha  301,OOOha  892,OOOha
Land
Average  11.7  14.1  20.6  26.0  19.8  18.3
Yield
(qq/ha)
% of  68.7%  16.4%  11.3%  2.5%  1.0%  100%
Producers
% of  18.2%  19.1%  14.1%  14.9%  33.7%  100%
Land
% of  11.6%  14.7%  15.9%  21.3%  36.5%  100%
Yield
Note: Costa Rica, El  Salvador, Guatemala,  Honduras, Nicaragua.
Source:  ECLAC (2002, p.29), based on estimates from  respective countries'  national coffee
associations
Coffee Laborers
140.  It is estimated that there are more than 8 times as many coffee  laborers as
producers.  Some are "full-time" employees  living  on or near coffee farms, and many
more are seasonal  laborers - especially during harvest season.  Many "micro producers"
also seek employment with larger coffee producers.  A significant proportion of seasonal
laborers during harvest migrate to coffee producing areas from other areas.  These
seasonal migrants might have their own small landholdings  where they produce food
staples and might also seek other sources of seasonal employment in agriculture  or other
sectors.
141.  As can be observed  in the following table, about 28% of the economically  active
rural labor force in the Central American countries derive some employment and income
from coffee production and harvesting.  In Nicaragua 42% and in Guatemala 31% of the
rural labor force works in coffee.  Interestingly, in Costa Rica, where coffee is least
important in terms of share of GDP and exports, a high proportion of the rural labor force
(28%) is involved in coffee.
142.  As can be observed in the table, daily wages range from US2.3/day in Nicaragua,
US3.0-3.6/day in Honduras, Guatemala  and El Salvador,  and US$7.6/day  in Costa Rica.
Although there  are official minimum wage laws in the countries, there are numerous
reports of wages for coffee laborers being lower than the minimum rate.  There  is also48
evidence that many individuals  and households that are seasonal coffee laborers are
classified as "poor".
Table 8.2: Estimated  Emplovment in eoffee Production  in Central  America
Country  Economically  Labor Force  % Rural Labor  Average
Active Labor  Employed  Employed in  Wage per
Force in Rural  in Coffee (full-  Coffee  Labor Day
Areas  time and  (US$/day)
seasonal labor)
Costa Rica  725,000  200,000  28%  $7.6
El Salvador  936,000  160,000  17%  3.6
Guatemala  2,286,000  700,000  31%  3.2
Honduras  1,152,000  300,000  26%  3.0
Nicaragua  672,000  280,000  42%  2.3
TOTAL  5,771,000  1,640,000  28%
Central America
Source: ECLAC (2002,  p.21)
B. Impacts of the Coffee Crisis  in CentralAmerica
143.  It is somewhat difficult to isolate the socio-economic  impacts of the coffee crisis on
the Central America countries because there has been a series of negative shocks that
have  overlapped and exacerbated each other.  These shocks include Hurricane Mitch,
which caused widespread destruction in 1998, erratic rainfall and persistent drought over
the past few years, and the decline in international commnodity prices for major export
crops (e.g., coffee, bananas, oil palm and citrus).  In addition, there was a serious
earthquake  in El Salvador in January-February  2001, and tropical storm Michelle affected
Honduras  and Nicaragua in the fall of 2001.  Thus, the drastic fall in coffee prices since
1990 is only one of many negative forces sweeping rural areas, and occurring  at a time
when many poor rural households are extremely vulnerable  to additional shocks -
because their assets bases and risk management  capacities have been reduced.  As such,
the current coffee crisis is really part of the broader rural poverty crisis in these countries.
From lInterAction on the Central American Crisis - Updated April 2002
"Much of Central America is suffering from a worsening food crisis precipitated by a combination of
droughts,  floods, and poverty linked to falling world coffee prices. Since  last summer,  very little rain fell
across much of the region, causing widespread crop losses in  Guatemala,  Honduras, El Salvador and
Nicaragua.  The persistent drought has been described as the worst disaster to hit Central America since
Hurricane Mitch, and comes on the heels of  two devastating earthquakes that struck El Salvador in
January and February 2001  and tropical storm Michelle,  which battered  Honduras and Nicaragua in  the
fall of 2001.  The drought has caused agricultural losses of up to 80 percent in  parts of Guatemala and El
Salvador, in  Guatemala  alone, an estimated  150,000 people, including nearly 60,000 children under the
age of five, are suffering from acute malnutrition.  Severe drought in  the eastem part of El Salvador has
affected over 300,000 people,  and over 100,000 more are affected in  Nicaragua.  A further 300,000
people  are experiencing food insecurity in Honduras, which has lost over 50,000 hectares of agricultural
land to tropical storn  Michelle last fall. Across  the region, nearly a million people are now facing food
security  problems."
See www.interaction.org/centralamerica49
144.  Recent USAID appraisals of the situation in the respective countries highlight
widespread reductions  in employment - "Many hundreds of thousands of seasonal and
permanent coffee farm jobs, are being lost".  Poor rural households'  have lost
employment and income because there is lower demand for coffee laborers, a smaller
harvest to pick, and lower wages.  The decreases  in employment  and incomes have
resulted increased food insecurity and malnutrition,  some abandonment of farms, and
increased migration out of rural areas - both domestic or cross-border.  To make matters
worse, USAID concludes that the coffee crisis is reducing government revenues,
weakening national financial  systems, and contributing to overall social and economic
instability.  That is, the coffee crisis is creating a situation whereby there is a lack of
domestic resources available to mitigate the crisis and its socio-economic  impacts, and
the crisis deepens.
Survey Results from El Salvador and Nicaragua
Surveys were recently conducted  by the World  Bank's Commodity  Risk Management  Group
(RDVCG) in Nicaragua and El Salvador to assess producers'  responses  to low coffee prices and
their perceptions of price risk and other risks (see  World Bank 2001, 2002).  Results indicate that
the immediate responses by producers  has been to reduce costs, particularly  of purchased inputs
and labor.  Producers also seem to be harvesting  their coffee, but cutting  back on the number of
pickings, harvesting both ripe and unripe cherries.  Results also indicate some other risk coping
strategies to reduce expenditures.  Many producer households are reducing their consumption.
Smaller producers,  in particular, indicated that they are increasing  informal borrowing and are
concerned about losses of other  employment.  Almost all producers, regardless  of size,  ranked
coffee price  shifts as the most important  risk they faced  (e.g., as compared to nature and health
related risks).
145.  The recent report by ECLAC (2002) notes that the coffee crisis has had a significant
and widespread impact on the economies of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua.  Not only are coffee producers and laborers directly  affected,
but linked economic activities  in commerce, transportation, storage and processing,
financial  services, and retail sales have all been impacted through a negative multiplier
effect.
146.  However,  according to the ECLAC report,  the most serious impacts have been on
coffee producers  and laborers and concentrated  in rural areas.  The financial situation of
coffee producers in Central America has suffered considerably,  as have financial
institutions that provided loans.  Loan arrears  and defaults are increasing and access to
new loans is limited.  This has resulted in a financial crisis for many producers and
financial institutions.  To reduce costs and cut their losses, many producers  have cut back
or eliminated many cultural practices (e.g., weeding and pruning, fertilizer applications,
treatments against pests and diseases),  decreased the number of harvest pickings.  In
addition many producers  are cutting back on wages and/or paying wages in-kind.  Some
farms have been abandoned  or neglected.  Reduced production activities has lowered
expenses  on purchased inputs and labor and led,  in many cases to lower yields and/or50
lower quality coffee.  Especially when cutting back on harvest pickings.  All of these cost
saving practices translate into a lower demand for labor - both full-time and  seasonal.  In
most cases the lower demand for labor has led to excesses in the supply of labor and
downward pressure on prices.  There are, however, reports that in some coffee producing
areas there is actually a lack of harvest labor because laborers have sought alternative
employment opportunities in expectation of lower wages and labor days.
147.  According  to the ECLAC study (see table 8.3), it was estimated that compared  to
the 3 previous  years, in 2001,  labor demand was about 30%  less in Guatemala,  Honduras
and Nicaragua,  about 20% less in El Salvador and about 12%  less in Costa Rica.  In total,
for the five countries, this translated  into a loss of about 42 million labor days, or 170,010
full time equivalent jobs (based on 250 labor days)20, and a loss of income of almost
US$140 million.
Table 8.3: Estimates of Losses otEmployment and Wa  es in  Coffee Production  bi
Countrv for 2001
Country  (a)  (b)  (c) = b/a  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g) = d*f
Average  Reduction  %  Total  Reduction in  Daily  Total
# of  in # of  Reduction  Reduction  Full Time  Wages  Reduction
Labor  Labor  in Labor  in Labor  Employment  per  in Labor
Days  Days/ha  Days per  Days  Units  Labor  Income in
per ha  ha  (250 labor days  Day in  millions
(based on  =1  FTE)  US$  of US$
3 previous
years)
Costa  128.7  15.6  12%  1,675,000  6,700  7.8  12.7
Rica
El  141.4  28.4  20%  4,540,000  18,155  3.8  16.3
Salvador
Guatemala  221.0  71  32%  19,380,000  77,530  3.2  62.0
Honduras  163.0  50  31%  12,250,000  49,000  3.0  36.7
Nicaragua  147.0  43  29%  4,660,000  18,625  2.3  10.7
TOTAL  --  -_  1  42,505,000  170,010  138.6
Source: ECLAC (2002, p.3 1)
148.  However, these estimates of lost income do not necessarily translate into "actual"
declines in household income and consumption.  That is because the coffee laborers are
active trying to adopt risk coping strategies and there has also been some safety nets
provided by governments,  donors and NGOs.  In fact, the actual income and consumption
impacts on households of coffee laborers  and producers has not been researched in depth,
and such an analysis is a major upcoming priority for the World Bank.  Proposals for
such research using existing household surveys are currently being prepared at the World
20  In reality,  many of the laborers  are seasonal and only a small proportion  are "full-time.  So, it is clear that
many more than  170,010 income  earners were negatively  impacted.51
Bank.  In addition IDB is considering complementary  rapid appraisals to improve the
understanding of the impact of the crisis on coffee households.
149.  Despite the lack of in-depth analyses of the impacts of the coffee crisis on the poor,
there has been substantial anecdotal  evidence that many poor rural households that derive
some income and employment from coffee are, in fact, suffering.
C. Safety Nets - The Institutional  Response
150.  As mentioned earlier,  when governments have attempted to respond to a "coffee
crisis," they have focused attention on coffee producers: notably those with outstanding
loans, which are typically medium and large coffee producers.  Sometimes,  small
producers have also benefited  from government  assistance. An example is a current
program in Mexico to compensate small coffee producers for low prices.  This program
provides special support to the income of coffee producers with areas for coffee under 5
ha (according the  1992 coffee census) and for up to 750 pesos per ha (about US$75/ha).
151.  Coffee laborers have not tended to benefit from direct government assistance.
Large proportions of coffee laborers are classified as "poor" by various poverty
assessments.  Indeed, coffee laborers tend to be overlooked.  This is important because, in
times of economic  crises, medium and large coffee  producers tend to cut back on their
use of purchased inputs and labor. With less demand for labor, wages tend to fall.  This
can have serious negative impacts on poor coffee laborers, a large proportion of who are
also small producers.
152.  Since many small coffee producers and laborers also cultivate  staple foods for home
consumption, any concurrent weather-related risks,  such as drought,  can exacerbate the
negative  welfare impacts of low coffee prices.  This is currently the case in many Central
American countries, where yield losses from drought are compounding the downside
shock on small coffee producers and laborers.
153.  Moreover, others in the rural economy---including  coffee input suppliers,
processors,  and providers  of household goods and services---are  also impacted by low
coffee prices and low coffee-related  incomes.  Like coffee laborers, they also do not tend
to benefit from any direct government assistance  in time of crisis.
154.  Recognizing the existence of a rural poverty crisis is an important first step in
suggesting possible social protection strategies and options.  Institutional  responses to
address the social problems stemming from the coffee crisis could include:
Providing  targeted  and  self-targeted  emergency assistance to the rural  poor.  The
poverty crisis from low coffee prices has led to increased  food insecurity and
incidences of malnutrition.  USAID has been responding to the crisis by
mobilizing various emergency  food aid programs  and using NGOs to administer
them.  This rapid response has been  credited with staving off a major disaster.
21 See  Diario Official,  Wednesday  31  January 2001.52
There is a need to improve early warning systems of crises and mechanisms for
providing emergency relief with cooperation of the respective Governments
(national and local), along with donors and NGOs.
O Providing  assistance  to unemployed coffee workers and their  families.  Nicaragua
offers an example.  A work-for-food program has been recently set up in
partnership with coffee producers.  Participants are employed  on private coffee
farms and receive partial payment from owners; food allotments to make up the
difference. The reduced wages allows coffee producers to employ more laborers
than they could have otherwise in this crisis situation.  This program aims to help
both coffee laborers and larger producers.  In Mexico,  a temporary employment
program  (PET)22 and a natural disaster fund (FONDEN) provide coverage to
rural people when external shocks occur, mainly related to natural calamities
(droughts, floods, earthquakes,  etc).
o  Improving safety net programs. There is a need for safety net programs for coffee
laborers, small producers,  and others in the rural  economy: both targeted and
self-targeted programs. These programs could include food aid, food-for-work,
and temporary employment.  They should also include assistance for families and
children.  Social funds could also possibly be mobilized. Such programs will
require a case-by-case analysis in different countries and regions, and where
possible should be mainstreamed  into existing safety net programs  for the rural
poor. A key issue in the design of safety nets will be the fact that many coffee
laborers are seasonal migrants.  This can make geographic  targeting difficult.
o  Assisting coffee laborers  and small producers in skills development and training
to improve their mobility, either within or beyond the coffee sector.  The high
supply of unskilled rural labor puts downward pressure on wages;  skills
development can offset this. Moreover,  laborers will probably need new skills as
part of the process of diversification.
o  Promoting the use ofprice risk management instruments. To provide
unemployment insurance to laborers and/or to fund alternative employment,
medium and large producers could be given incentives to use instruments such as
commodity price insurance (see also earlier section on managing price risks).
Possibilities could also be explored for governments  to use price risk
management instruments to help fund safety net programs for coffee laborers and
others.  However, if prices remain low for a period of years, commodity price
risk management instruments will have a very limited use in funding safety
programs.  These instruments are better suited for temporary shocks rather than
persistent ones.
22  PET is a standing rural poverty program that can be scaled up in times of economic crisis or natural
disasters.53
*  Providing  assistance to link the laborers' associations  with the producers'
associations  to help identify common issues and capabilities to respond better to
crises.54
EIX.  ENVI[RONMENTAL  CONSIIDERATIIONS
155.  The environmental dimensions of coffee production and post-harvest processing are
very complex.  Technology choices and other decisions by coffee producers impact on-
farm environmental  quality, and these choices and decisions also can have important
regional and global environmental  impacts.  Links between agricultural  activities and
environmental  quality (i.e., enviromnental externalities)  are not unique to coffee.
However,  environmental dimensions of coffee production and post-harvest processing are
striking because they are often located in sensitive environmental  areas that influence the
overall health of large ecosystems including biodiversity,  soil and water erosion,
temperature and rainfall patterns, water flows and quality in watersheds, carbon
sequestering,  etc.  (Halweil,  2002; Fleischer, 2002).
156.  Mesoamerica,  which includes all of Central America (Costa Rica,  El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua along with Belize, Panama, and parts of southern
Mexico) has been named as one of the world's biodiversity hotspots - an area of very
high biodiversity that is under severe threat (Pagiola and Ruthenberg, forthcoming).  And
many coffee growing areas are particularly fragile ecosystems since they are located at
high altitudes and on mountain slopes.
157.  Coffee is a major component of overall forested  and protected areas in the Central
America countries.  In El Salvador, the coffee area is more than 10 times as large as the
entire system of protected areas.  The potential role of biodiversity-friendly  coffee
becomes all the more important when location is taken into account.  Many coffee areas
are located close to protected areas, thus expanding their area and connecting them to
each other. Thus biodiversity-friendly  coffee could extend protected areas by a non-
negligible proportion.  This role is particularly important in countries such as El Salvador,
where protected areas are small and isolated.
Table 9.1: Coffee and protected  areas in CentralAmerica  (in square kilometers)
Total Area  Forest  Area  Protected  area  Coffee  Cocoa
Costa Rica  51,100  12,480  7,006  1,000  200
El Salvador  21,040  1,050  102  1,650  4
Guatemala  108,890  38,410  18,277  2,600  45
Honduras  112,090  41,150  11,120  2,490  58
Nicaragua  130,000  55,600  9,638  941  13
Sources  World Bank, 2001
A.  Coffee Economics and Environmental  Issues
158.  Two important points need to be emphasized when discussing the environmental
dimensions of coffee production and post-harvest processing:
23 The recent RDV Agricultural Technology Note by Gerd Fleischer (and the background papers prepared
for the Note) provides an review of the literature  on environmental  dimensions of coffee.55
a) Environmental  issues in coffee production  and post-harvest processing are
important to all levels of technification,  from small producers  using low-input
traditional production and processing methods and to larger producers employing
substantial  amounts of inputs to achieve high yields, and for large post-harvest
processing facilities.  Thus, it is not possible to generalize that small producers  are
"good stewards"  and large producers "bad stewards" of the environment.  All
coffee producers can have positive and/or negative  impacts on the environment
depending on their initial agro-ecological  conditions and their technological
choices and other decisions.
b) Both low and high prices have affected technology choices and other decisions
by coffee producers  in Central America in recent years, and thereby had potential
for generating negative environmental  impacts.  Thus, either low or high coffee
prices can have a negative environmental  impacts.  This is an important point,
since the focus is now on the negative environmental  impact of low coffee prices.
Therefore,  it is important to consider ways to encourage sustainable
environmental  practices irregardless of coffee price levels.
159.  Coffee can be grown under conditions which functionally resemble a natural forest
and can thereby provide many of the environmental benefits of a natural forest.24 The
traditional  way of producing  coffee in Central  America, using naturally growing trees as
shade and also inter-planting  food staples and other perennial or annual crops, not only
conserves  soil and water like a forest, but also supports a variety of plants and animals
and serves as a natural moderator of the microclimate.  In addition, with traditional
methods of producing coffee, farmers have a natural means to diversify incomes and even
help manage coffee price and yield (e.g., weather related,  pests and diseases) risks since
additional income and/or home consumption could be derived from the wood, food,
medicinal plants,  etc.  Also, the traditional methods were effective means of generating
organic fertilizer and providing natural protection against most diseases and pests.  In
fact, according to Halweil (2002): "Coffee,  if grown right, can be one of the rare human
industries that actually restore the Earth's health."
FROM COFFEE  RAINFOREST TO COFFEE  PLANTA TION
According to Halweil (2002, p.37-38): " Until a few decades ago, most of the world's coffee was
grown  in the understory of rainforests, with farmers  looking after the rainforest trees as a natural
part of growing coffee.  But, more and more coffee is being produced in what was rainforest -
clear-cut tracts of land without shade, that give off the dry burning scent of ammonia fertilizer.
Over 40 percent of the coffee area in Colombia, Mexico,  Central America,  and the Caribbean  has
been converted to "sun" coffee,  with an additional  one-quarter of the area in conversion."
160.  In Central America, shade-grown coffee  - in contrast,  coffee grown without shade
('sun' or 'technified'  coffee) - provides the greatest opportunity for environmentally-
24  Because of the high altitudes and high rainfall areas  much of the coffee  in Central America is grown,
conditions often functionally  resemble a natural rainforest.56
friendly production,  particularly in the more traditional  (so-called 'rustic') coffee
production with canopies from diverse native tree species. A significant proportion of
Mesoamerica's  coffee production is shade-grown.  Large areas also meet the basic criteria
for organic production - essentially by default, due to farmers'  inability to afford modem
inputs.
Organic Coffee - What is "Organic"  About It?
Demand for organic coffee, although  driven primarily by consumer perceptions of health  risks
associated with agrochemical residues,  also tends to have environmentally  benign effects.  There is
considerable  overlap between shade-grown and organic  coffee production,  in that sun coffee is
almost never organic,  while shade-grown  coffee usually  is. As discussed below,  however,  the
formal requirements  for 'organic'  certification go well beyond the absence of agrichemical use,
often making it difficult for producers to qualify.  Broadly, organic  certification requires limited or
no use of agrochemicals  and measures to preserve  soil fertility.  If in addition to organic,  producers
wish a fair trade certification,  this requires buyers to develop long-term relationships  with
producers, guarantee them minimum prices, and provide them with credit. Together, organic, fair-
trade, and shade-grown  coffees are sometimes  referred to as 'sustainable'  coffees (Giovannucci,
2001).
161.  Throughout Central America, shade-grown coffee production has been under
pressure. Conversion to higher-yielding sun coffee varieties was heavily promoted
beginning in the 1  970s, to increase farmer returns  and reduce the risk of coffee rust, a
fungal disease.  Relatively high coffee prices in the 1980s and  1990s also encouraged the
conversion of some shade grown coffee to intermediate technologies and technified
coffee with less shade  and increased use of agrochemicals in order to increase
productivity of land planted to coffee.25 The introduction of higher yielding coffee
varieties at higher tree/land  area densities and the increased use of agrochemicals  has, in
some cases, led traditional coffee producers to cut down shade trees and abandon the
biodiversity and inter-planted crops.  In addition, there was an expansion of coffee
production in areas with natural forest cover.  On the other hand, low coffee prices in
recent years have encouraged  some coffee producers to shift out of coffee production by
cutting down both coffee and shade trees and even encouraging deforestation  of adjacent
forests  in an attempt to increase income sources (Pagiola and Ruthenberg,
forthcoming).26 In table 9.2, approximate allocation of coffee area to different levels of
technology in the early  1990s, by country, is presented.
25  In many cases, public support services such as technical  assistance and extension programs,  and credit
programs were providing  incentives to producers to shift to higher technology levels.
6 Recent decades have seen coffee production  shifting either to shade-less  'sun'  coffee or to annual crops
or pasture, all of which provide substantially  lower environmental  benefits than shade-grown coffee.57
Table 9.2:  Coffee Area (in thousands of hectares) and Level of Technol
Technology Level
Country  Traditional  Intermediate  "Technified"  Total  Percent  Percent  Percent
Area  Area Planted  Area Planted  Coffee  Traditional  Intermediate  "Technified"
Planted  Area  Technology
Costa Rica  11  54  43  108  10%  50%  40%
El  152  0  13  165  92%  0%  8%
Salvador  _
Guatemala  110  86  49  245  45%  35%  20%
Honduras  30  100  70  200  15%  50%  35%
Nicaragua  53  14  27  94  56%  14%  29%
TOTAL  356  254  202  812  44%  31%  25%
Source: Rice and Ward (1996)
Notes: Data for  1993, except Nicaragua  data for  1984.
162.  Using data from the early 1990s, it can be observed  in table 9.2, that about 25% of
the total coffee area in the Central American countries was produced using technified
methods compared to 44% using traditional and 31 % using intermediate technologies.
However,  there are considerable differences  in levels of technology practiced in the
different  countries.  For example,  in Costa Rica about 40% was technified and about 50%
intermediate and only  10% traditional technologies.  At the other extreme,  in El Salvador
about 92% of coffee area was traditional.  It is important to recall that, as pointed out
previously, because of the tendency toward low coffee productivity per land area using
traditional technologies compared to higher technology levels, the share of actual coffee
production using the various technologies is skewed in favor of the more technified
methods.  Thus, although almost  1/2 of coffee land area might be devoted to traditional
technologies,  it is possible that this accounts for less than  1/4 of coffee production.
163.  Site-specific environmental  conditions, including soil and microclimate,  determine
whether the use of the new technologies  of coffee varieties  and agrochemicals  is
appropriate.  In cases where the adoption of new varieties and agrochemicals  were
introduced  as a "package," without due regard for environmental  sustainability, increased
production was achieved. Unfortunately,  however,  the decision to "technify"  production
has sometimes been a "lose-lose"  proposition; new varieties and increased use of
agrochemicals have not resulted in higher yields.  The implementation of the new
technologies  has altered the natural ecosystem, forcing coffee producers  to continually
increase the amount of agrochemicals  they use. These practices have not only been
damaging to the environment,  but have also undermined the competitiveness  of the
coffee enterprises  themselves.58
Farmers' Decisions and Environmental  Quality: Are Externalities Internal or External?
"Decisions  on whether to maintain  land under shade-grown  coffee are made  by the farmers  involved, in light of
their  own  preferences  and  constraints.  They  do  not  generally  consciously  decide  to  damage  biodiversity,
because most of these benefits  do not accrue to them. Farmers deciding  whether  to maintain  shade-grown  coffee
or convert  it to sun-coffee  or to other crops will  consider the benefits  from increased  crop production  resulting
from  the  switch,  and  will  consider  the  cost  of making  the  switch,  but  they  will  not  consider  the  loss  of
biodiversity benefits,  not the loss of other benefits  such as watershed  protection  The reason  is simple:  whereas
farmers  receive  payment  (or consume  directly)  the  crops  they  grow,  they  receive  no  compensation  for  the
ecological  services  that  biodiversity  provides.  These  benefits,  therefore,  simply  do  not  enter  into  their
decisionmaking  (Pagiola and Ruthenberg, forthcoming)."
However,  this  argument  means  that  there  should  be  some  convergence  between  farmer's  decisions  and
protecting  the  environment  IF the right economic  incentives  exist.  For example,  there  is  some evidence  that
coffee  produced  under shade-grown  conditions  is  of better  quality and therefore  might  be  able  to command  a
price premium.  Also,  there  is  evidence  that under  certain  conditions  using organic  production  practices  and
inter-planting  can  provide  net  income  flows  per  land  area comparable  to technified  systems  of production.  In
addition,  if it  is  possible  for  producers  to  receive  premium  payments  for  protecting  biodiversity  (e.g.,  "bird
friendly  coffee").  In  fact,  as  is  mentioned  throughout  this  report,  one  of the  major  challenges  is  how  to
internalize  the  enviromnental  externalities  associated  with  coffee.  See  Giovannucci,  Brandriss,  Brenes,
Ruthenberg, and Agostini (2002).
B. General  Environmental  Considerations  in Coffee Production
164.  The main environmental considerations  of coffee production, from cherry to roasted
coffee, are the management of the coffee plantation, preservation of biodiversity,  soil and
water conservation,  agrochemical use, and the consumption of water in the post-harvest
processing.  The most prominent environmental problems are related to these issues and
are related to lack of environmental awareness and sustainability.
165.  Farm  management and land  use. No matter the method used for coffee production,
good management of the plantation is key, including:
o  Appropriate use of agrochemicals  for pests control  (pesticides) and yield
improvement (fertilizer);
o  Maintaining not only the coffee plants, but the shade trees, and, using adequate
types and densities;
o  Conserving soil and water through erosion control with contour planting and
appropriate ground cover;
o  Managing  waste on plantations,  including recycling of residues (pulp, water).
166.  However, many small coffee producers have other priorities and pursue other
activities.  Accordingly,  the effort seems to be focused on the harvest,  more or less
leaving the plantations to themselves the rest of the year.
167.  Biodiversity. Traditional  coffee plantations used to have levels of biodiversity
similar to natural forests.  As the amount of agrochemicals has increased with the
"technification" of the coffee production, the natural levels of biodiversity have slowly
disappeared.  Preservation of biodiversity  is a fundamental part of sustainability,  as59
coverage provides shelter to animals and maintains the balance of pests and diseases
found naturally in the ecosystem. The intensified coffee production, on the other hand,
sees any crop apart from coffee as a potential competitor.  In some cases, coffee is
produced in areas better suited for other crops/forests, with negative consequences for
biodiversity and the ecosystem.
168.  Soil and water conservation. "Technified" coffee production with intensive use of
agrochemicals  leaves the soil in a state of ecological imbalance,  lacking the capability to
recycle the necessary  nutrients and hampering the ability of the soil to contain water.
Furthermore, the risk of erosion increases without sufficient groundcover to hold soil and
help water infiltrate to the aquifer and keep the soil moist. Given the fact that coffee is
often cultivated  on slopes,  there is an even higher risk of losing the top fertile layer of
humus,  which is essential for the quality of the coffee.
169.  Use of  water. Wet milling coffee requires large amounts of water (200-500 liters to
produce 46 kg of green beans).  The process is the same whether it takes place in big mills
or by individual  coffee farmers.  Given the large amounts of water used, mills tend to be
situated near a river (and in some cases in the river).  Water used in the milling process is
highly contaminating,  containing sugar from the pulp and residuals from the
fermentation.  Discharging the water directly in the stream or river not only pollutes the
water, destroying aquatic  flora and fauna as well as the surroundings, but also
contaminates  the drinking water for communities  downstream.  During the peak of the
harvest, the individual farmer re-uses water to speed up the fermentation process of the
next lot. However, recycling fermentation  water can affect the quality of the coffee.
C Environmental  Aspects of Strategies  to Ameliorate the Coffee Crisis
170.  In deciding whether to pursue  a strategy of increased competitiveness  in coffee
production or diversification out of coffee, producers make  an indirect choice regarding
the impact in the environment.  It is difficult to determine  the precise environmental
impacts of each strategy, whether positive or negative.  Some potential  linkages between
increased competitiveness,  diversification  and the environment are discussed below.
171.  For land that does not lend itself to any other agricultural pursuit and for important
watersheds  and forests, payments for environmental services may be a viable alternative
livelihood,  or at least a potential  supplemental revenue  stream from sound land use.  Land
can be set aside for forest preservation,  for water and carbon sequestration,  for public
parks, or for other environmentally beneficial uses.
172.  Although a lot of attention from the World Bank and other development institutions
might be focused  on smaller coffee producers,  it is important to include medium and
large size producers in sustainable coffee programs. The participation  of medium and
large coffee producers is essential to any environmentally  oriented coffee  strategy and
broad-based  rural development  plan. Many of these larger producers have important
marketing contacts, skills, and experience  and might even be better situated to adopt
alternative technologies.  Small, neighboring producers might be able to ride their60
coattails into premium coffee markets.  And, these larger producers are major employers
of coffee laborers.
Environmental  Impacts of an Increased  Competitiveness  Strategy
o  Biodiversity. Aiming toward specialty coffees entails managing the shade forest
and taking a proactive approach to improve biodiversity and the ecosystem, as
well as soil and water conservation.  Apart from benefiting the environment, the
strategy can yield economic benefits to the producer if it opens access to markets
selling environmentally friendly products,  at premium prices.
o  Implementation of  cleaner technology. Water-saving  and recycling measures
implemented in both large and individual mills can indirectly be linked to quality
management.
o  Farm management. Good management procedures  include erosion control, the
sound use of agrochemicals,  and shade and waste management, along with the
use of resistant varieties,  harvesting of ripe cherries, and proper preparation and
cleaning of the plantation after the harvest. A well-managed plantation from the
environmental  perspective has direct positive linkages with quality: for example,
through the prevention of defects and uniformity of the harvested cherries.
o  Organic  coffee. Organic coffee production involves several activities with
positive impacts on the environment.  Decreasing  the use of agrochemicals  and
focusing on shade management increases the level of biodiversity.  Moreover, it
increases the environmental  awareness of the consumer.
o  Knowledge and information. Improvement of coffee quality requires knowledge
and information.  This can be provided through technical assistance to the small
coffee producer in remote areas, and could be offered through NGOs and other
scientific institutions  conducting research in coffee production.
Environmental  Impacts of a Diversification  Strategy
o  Biodiversity. The biggest negative impact of diversification  into other crops or
non-agricultural activities includes the possibility of destroying the existing  shade
forest. The clearing of land to develop non-agricultural activities  will have a
negative effect on the ecosystem, biodiversity, and soil and water conservation, if
the necessary measures are not taken. An environmental  impact assessment in
every case can assure that only activities with no negative environmental  impacts
will be implemented.
o  Agroecological  conditions. Crops intermixed  with coffee and/or new crops might
not be adequate for agroecological  conditions, potentially causing negative
environmental impacts.
o  Technical assistance. Access to technical  assistance is the key element to make a
qualified decision as to introduce  new crops or other non-agricultural  activities.
This is especially true when diversifying  into crops that are less known by the
farmers.61
D. The Experience in Latin  America with Shade-Qrown coffee27
173.  The World Bank and the Global  Environment Facility (GEF) have both been
interested in shade-grown  coffee because of its potential to simultaneously  address local
development issues and broader environmental  issues. Two projects  in the Latin America
Region28 have been financed by GEF/WB through their medium-sized grant window to
promote shade-coffee  as part of a biodiversity conservation strategy. The Promotion of
Biodiversity Conservation within Coffee Landscapes Project  in El Salvador, and the El
Triunfo Biosphere  Reserve: Habitat  Enhancement in Productive  Landscapes Project  in
Chiapas, Mexico.  These two projects have very similar objectives but use different
approaches  and are being implemented in different contexts,  providing a valuable
opportunity  to see the mechanism  at work. The El Salvador  project has closed recently
and the Chiapas project is in its final year of implementation.
Results and lessons learned of these two projects include:
174.  Biodiversity conservation, coffee production and  poverty reduction can be
combined&9. The Chiapas project has demonstrated that innovation and a sustainable
market mechanism allows poor communities to substantially improve their livelihood
through increased  incomes from growing coffee while protecting biodiversity of global
value. The approach of the project was built on the three pillars of sustainable
development:
*  Economic sustainability as local growers  and their communities are now earning
more than ever before (about 20% income increase) by growing and marketing
coffee that is biodiversity friendly.
*  Environmnental  sustainability as instead of cutting down the trees for expanding
production, the incentives  for-the small farmer now is to protect the trees because
it is the key factor to their increased income.
*  Social  sustainability as local communities are  now much better organized and
their organizations  better run through improved capacity for applying
participatory techniques and tools for community natural resources and
development plans, plan implementation  and plan evaluation.
175.  The result is that a small project with a small budget has changed a threatening
dynamic of deforestation and sustained poverty.  It has been shown that in a highly
marginalized,  poor, remote but biodiversity rich area small farners have improved their
livelihood in a tangible. manner while contributing to protecting the local, regional and
global environtnent.  It is for these results that the project has been selected for a feature
in the World Development Report 2003.
176.  Attention to markets and commercialization is key when promoting  the concept of
shade coffee.  Both projects had to be 'retrofitted'  after project start to better incorporate
27  Drafted by Ina-Marlene  Ruthenberg
28  A project each in Uganda and in Nicaragua  included work on some aspects of sustainable coffee
production  in the context of larger projects,  with objectives that are broader.
The  El Triunfo  Project  in Chiapas,  Mexico  is featured  in the World  Development  Report  2003  for
successfully  combining economic, environmental  and social  sustainability.  The following  information has
been  drawn  form a background  note prepared  for the WDR.  For more information  on the project, please
visit the website:  http://wblnOO18.worldbank  org/me_eltriunfo/me eltriunfooar  nsf62
these aspects and to strengthen producer organization's capacity to assess and access
markets.  Simple and rather modest marketing study were envisaged  in the initial project
design of both projects but in a situation where a market for a product is not yet
developed and subsequently no market data existed this approach turned out to be
insufficient.  One year into project implementation, the Chiapas project shifted project
resources to focus on aspects of commercialization and institutional strengthening of
producer organizations in order for them to access  and test an emerging market for
environmentally friendly coffee.  The deal brokered by Conservation International and
Starbucks certainly gave a boost to the feasibility of selling their coffee but the challenge
has been for them to sustain the relationship with Starbucks and to diversify their sales to
other companies in order to avoid dependency on one. However,  to deliver consistently
high quality coffee in a timely manner to demanding international  operators requires
business know-how and managerial  competence  by the peasant producer organizations.
Three years later it is clear that part of the economic benefit that the coffee farmers under
the Chiapas project were able to realize comes  from selling directly to coffee roasters in
the importing country that acknowledge  the high quality produced by them. Therefore,
the project demonstrates that it is possible to build this capacity but it is a process and
takes focused and tailored support.
177.  Does the market  provide a premium  for biodiversity  friendly grown coffee? The
two GEF/WB financed projects in the Meso-American  Corridor promoted  shade-coffee
under the hypothesis to be able to harness consumers'  willingness to pay for conservation
by inducing them to pay a premium for biodiversity-friendly  shade-grown coffee.  The
belief that consumers would be willing to pay a premium for biodiversity-friendly  coffee
is based on the rapid growth of the specialty and gourmet coffee market and on the
success of other 'cause-related'  or 'story' coffees,  including organic and fair trade coffee
(Rice and McLean,  1999). Sales of specialty coffees reached over US$5 billion in 2000 in
the USA alone, and are expected to continue to grow at rates of 5-10 percent annually
(Giovannucci,  2001). There are clear signs that trying to capture this consumer
willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation can be a successful route. The coffee
from the Chiapas project has been sold successfully and repeatedly with a premium.
However,  that premium principally stemmed from the coffee being certified organic. The
sales have yet to see an additional premium for being certified as shade-grown,  which is a
process that is still developing.  The El Salvador project is more advanced with the
number of farms certified as 'shade-grown',  but sales have been more limited as the
market was not paying as high a premium. Contrary to the Chiapas  'shade  certification',
the El Salvador certification does not incorporate organic as a principle and allows for
limited and well-specified use of agro-chemicals.  An approach that under biodiversity
considerations  is not problematic but currently has much less market demand.
178.  Biodiversity-friendly  certification has  many faces.  Although a set of criteria for
shade-coffee does exist30 - many actors, many concepts and diverse local  situations make
it difficult to apply the criteria in each microclimate.  El Salvador with the rainforest
alliance's EKO-OK label promotes Integrated Pest Management  that allows the limited
application of some synthetic agrochemicals.  This approach was chosen for El Salvador
30  Smithsonian Migratory  Birds Center criteria for shade-grown  coffee.63
as most participating coffee farmers were mid-sized and were already applying some
chemicals  and a conversion to organic would have been a long process.  In Chiapas the
setting was very different.  The project region is remote and the small farmers are highly
marginalized and very poor. Agricultural  services and technical assistance  has not
reached them and they produced their coffee without any chemicals and fertilizers.
However,  a trend emerged among these farmers to copy the 'technified'  production
system of some of the larger coffee farms in the area in order to increase yields. The
project instead built on the organic coffee movement in Chiapas,  supported among others
by a well-established strong cooperative  buttressed by the Catholic church.
179.  This decision was taken primarily in light of the market's recognition of organic
premiums.  It has allowed three of the seven producer groups under the project to pocket a
premium as close as 100% from most of their harvest in 2001 though about 40% has been
more typical.  Mexico's approach of a 'super-seal'  developed  under the  El Triunfo project
in Chiapas combines elements of three types of certification - organic, fair trade and
biodiversity-friendly.  The 'super-seal'  approach to certification is developing into the
first such national criteria as the Government of Mexico's Coffee  Council endorses and
promotes it.
180.  Quality, quality, quality. Neither organic or fair trade certification  nor the best
environmental  story will sell coffee with a premium if the quality is not good. The is a
hard lesson learned by coffee producers in both projects and well-intentioned
conservationists.  Thus, timely, good and continued technical assistance for high quality
production and processing is an important element for promoting 'shade-coffee'
production if farmers want to sell their coffee with a premium in the marketplace.
181.  Civil society  participation  and  partnerships  build a supportive momentum
necessary to promote and mainstream  the concept of  shade coffee. The El Salvador
project successfully build a broad understanding  of biodiversity friendly coffee  in the
country by reaching out to civil society and by strengthening  the government's  coffee
policy to integrate aspects of shade coffee . Furthermore, the country has identified shade
grown coffee  as a national patrimony with the creation of a 'Parque  Nacional de Cafe'.
The Chiapas project has also invested heavily in partnerships by initiating an 'El Triunfo
Roundtable'  bringing together government agencies, academic institutions, and local and
international NGOs. Sharing information and concepts has resulted in improved
coordination and new areas of collaboration,  e.g. in access to credits and technical
assistance. The National Coffee Association and the Ministry of Agriculture
(SAGARPA)  of Mexico  both have expressed their interest in promoting the concept of
shade coffee based on the work in Chiapas and are reviewing the possibility to integrate
elements of the concept into the government's national coffee production support
schemes.64
X.  IENSTITUTFONAL  AND TRADE POLICY IISSUJES
182.  Since the  1  990s, the global coffee sector has undergone important structural
changes. These changes  will shape the course of the industry during the next decade  and
beyond. To support the industry in the future, coffee institutions in Central America need
to revise their role and strategies and help identify new opportunities.
183.  From ministries and national coffee institutes and councils  to private associations,
research and extension institutes, to NGOs and regional  entities, many institutions and
organizations  operate in the coffee sector in Central America.  Private sector groups also
play an important role in such areas as exporting, processing,  banking, technology
transfer, and market information.
184.  Clear differences  in the scope and strength of institutions exist in Central America.
Some countries have strong institutional capacity with clear strategies and well-defined
technical,  social, and economic programs; others have public institutions with well-
defined roles but weak institutional  capacity. Institutions in some countries have begun to
streamline their processes and develop a market and service orientation.  Nevertheless,  in
some cases outdated regulations impose excessive  transaction costs.  In many countries,
fragmented producer associations contrast with strong milling and exporter associations.
Most countries suffer from an absence of cohesive national coffee policies  and strategies
to guide and regulate the large number of institutions serving the coffee industry.
185.  The objective of this section is not to present an exhaustive review of the
performance of coffee  institutions and organizations  in the past. Rather,  the approach is
forward-looking:  to identify areas where these entities can play a key role in facilitating  a
competitive transition for the coffee sector and sustainable development  of the rural
economy. The section makes a brief presentation of the main coffee institutions in
Central America and then concentrates  on how institutions and organizations  can support
the development and competitiveness of quality coffee in Central America.  A special
focus is on appropriate trade policy.
A.  Brief description of Coffee Institutions in Central  America
186.  The coffee sectors in Central America have been traditionally in the hands of the
private sector.  During the period of quotas under the International  Coffee Agreement,
local institutions were needed to administer the export quotas.  Since the suspension of
the export quotas in 1989, private and public institutions continue to play an important
role in the coffee sector of Central American countries.
187.  The main public institutions in the coffee sector in Central America are:
o  Costa Rica:  ICAFE
o  El Salvador:  Consejo Salvadoreno  del Cafe (CSC); PROCAFE
o  Guatemala:  ANACAFE
o  Honduras:  IHCAFE; Consejo Nacional del Cafe (CNC); Fondo Cafetero Nacional
(FCN)65
Nicaragua:  Ministry of Agriculture  (MAGFOR)
188.  There are differences in the roles, performance,  and effectiveness  of these
institutions.  In both Guatemala and Costa Rica the public institutions are considered to
be strong and with clear strategies  for their technical,  social and economic  programs.  In
El Salvador,  the role of the public institution  is split between CSC and PROCAFE with
the former being more of a political coordination  and marketing body and keeping
statistics and the latter dealing with technical  issues and extension. In Honduras, while
the role of public institutions  is now somewhat better defined and more transparent, they
have  yet to prove their effectiveness.  In Nicaragua,  coffee issues are dealt with at the
Ministry of  Agriculture.  Since many of these public institutions receive a major portion
of their operating budget from a levy on coffee exports, they currently face significant
financial difficulties because of the very low international prices.
189.  In addition to the public institutions in the Central American countries,  there are
also private institutions involved  in the coffee  sector.  These are mainly private sector
associations  and usually tend to be fragmented with the possible exception of exporters
associations.  There are several well-organized  producer organizations  that provide
balance to larger producers and processing and export companies.  The development of
these organizations  is usually within the realm of NGOs and cooperative development
entities.  There are some successful producer  organizations including FEDECOCAGUA
in Guatemala, UCRAPROBEX in El Salvador, PRODECOOP  in Nicaragua,  and
COOCAFE in Costa Rica,  amongst others.  These organizations  have leveled the playing
field for smaller farmers and have gained access to international markets.
190.  Associations and institutions have developed  alliances with other players  in the
domestic and international  coffee economy.  These vary in purpose and focus, though all
have the broad objective of improving services and hopefully  result in higher incomes for
their members.  Some examples of such alliances are as follows:
*  ANACAFE,  IHCAFE  and  ICAFE  have  negotiated  with financial  institutions  to
provide technical assistance required for credit to their members;
*  Coffee associations  in Central  America have  signed  letters of understanding  with
the Specialty Coffee Association of America (SCAA) that will provide them with
technical support and voice in the specialty coffee  industry;
*  Some cooperatives have negotiated long-term contracts with roasters guaranteeing
the use of their members'  coffee in the roasters'  blends and brands;
*  Some  cooperatives  have  been  particularly  successful  in  selling  to  fair  trade
organizations  and in promoting exports of organic coffee  at significant premiums.
Some of these  obtaining financing  from external  sources linked  to the production
and exports of fair-trade and organic coffees.
B. SupportinR the Competitiveness of Ouality Coffee
191.  The role of national ministries, coffee institutes, councils, and associations in
supporting the competitiveness of the coffee  sector begins with definition of, and
consensus about, a strategy.  Many have yet to develop sector-wide coordinated  measures66
that will reflect a combination of social priorities, economic capacity,  and political
resolve.  These must be harnessed in long-term programs that also produce some clear
results in the short tern.
192.  The absence of consistent coffee policies  often impedes the development of a
cohesive sectoral  strategy. Failure to develop coherent  strategies tends to waste resources,
duplicate efforts, confuse or alienate sector participants,  and consequently  reduce the
competitiveness  of a nation's coffee exports.  Since institutions help determine and
execute policies, a comprehensive  institutional assessment and review would serve many
countries well.  The key to success for all of these  institutions revolve around 3 factors:
1.  A cohesive policy and subsequent strategy that are determined by a
participatory process involving all of the sector's key actors
2.  Strong,  business-oriented  management  by  objective  for  lean  and
efficient operation
3.  Clearly established monitoring and evaluation that ensure
accountability and transparency
193.  To be effective,  any sectoral strategy requires a systemic approach that is
comprehensively  adopted throughout the chain of coffee production, processing,  and
export.  Institutions are critical in order to foster the broad adoption of strategies that are
widely supported throughout the sector. They have key roles to play and, with
government  support, they could:
•  Define standards  and incentives  for quality  production and  competitiveness.
Identifying, assessing, and supporting production of quality coffee requires,  first and
foremost, reaching consensus among the key coffee institutions on what quality
coffee means. This can include the legal recognition of market-defined norms and
standards.  Once quality is defined,  it can be followed with institutional support to the
competitive production and processing of quality coffee.  Market promotion of quality
coffees is also necessary.  Establishing and putting in place the right incentives for
quality recognition at the different stages of the production chain will motivate better
quality production.
o  Promote quality certification. In the long run, support can be extended to creating a
credible,  impartial, and independent  system for quality certification:  one that responds
to market requirements with respect to taste and the environmental  and social
concerns of consumers. Other incentives that promote production  and consumption of
quality coffee in the domestic market can be implemented.  A positive example  is
Brazil.  Its certification programs have promoted domestic consumption while
improving quality.
o  Support the organization  and consolidation  of smallholder  production.  Institutions
can help support the consolidation  and integration of the coffee industry,  especially
by working with small and medium producers to enable them to achieve better
economies of scale, adequate volume, improved quality control, and improved market
access.67
*  Provide technical assistance, research and extension services to coffee producers and
millers that is private sector driven and responds directly to their needs.  This can be a
key  element  for  empowering  smallholders  and  enhancing  quality.  Support  can  be
pursued  in two areas:  adopting  best practices for quality production  and prevention of
defects,  and capacity building for quality measurement,  through cupping and physical
evaluation.  Entities  such  as  IICA,  CATIE,  CIRAD,  the  regional  coffee  institute
PROMECAFE,  national  coffee  associations  and  institutes,  and  NGOs  have  been
working in these areas,  in addition to independent experts.
*  Build  partnerships.  National  institutions  and  privately  held  associations  have
developed  alliances with national  and global organizations.  These vary in purpose and
focus, although  all aim to provide better services  and secure higher incomes  for their
members  and for the coffee industry  in general.  For example,  ANACAFE,  IHCAFE,
and  ICAFE  have  undertaken  individual  arrangements  with  financial  institutions  to
provide technical  assistance  required for  credit to members.  Coffee  associations  and
the  Specialty  Coffee  Association  of  America  (SCAA)  have  signed  letters  of
understanding for training and assistance.
*  Improve market access. Partnership  building  is  also important  for improving market
access.  For  example,  cooperative  associations  have  negotiated  quotas  for members'
coffee  in higher-priced  alternative  markets  such as  Fair Trade,  as  well as  long-term
contracts  with roasters, guaranteeing  the use of their members'  coffee in the roasters'
blends  and  brands.  The  development  of a  legal  framework  in  which  international
coffee  contracting  laws  can  be  sustained  can  both  facilitate  and  encourage  the
development  of  long-term  contracts,  and  secure  partnerships  between  sellers  and
buyers  under  which  both  parties  can  be  sure  of performance.  Other  steps  could
include developing market information  systems for coffee producers  regarding  prices
and  potential  markets,  and  facilitating  technical  assistance  for  brand  development,
partnership  building,  and market access.
/
194.  Promoting the competitiveness of coffee  also includes defining and implementing
adequate trade policies and incentives for market outreach.  The indirect effect of higher
competitiveness and improved production and certification mechanisms  will be higher
quality product; this,  in turn, could increase demand. Central American countries should
allow free trade in coffee something that could encourage national industries to improve
forcing non-competitive  suppliers---which  are typically protected----to  exit and shift to
other sectors.
C  Trade Policy
195.  Trade barriers directly  impact the competitiveness  of coffee and indirectly
undermine  the potential of quality improvement.  Traditionally,  coffee has suffered
discrimination in trade and exchange policies. The current policy framework has been
improved by policy reforms, particularly in the 1990s, but important issues still remain
(see table X-1).68
196.  The region is still feeling the effects of export quotas established by the
International  Coffee  Organization, which required  strong intervention of the coffee
markets at the time of their implementation.  The export quotas were discontinued in
1989.  Central American countries have had an asymmetrical  treatment of imports and
exports.  While imports were typically protected, exports were subject to discrimination.
As part of this asymmetric  treatment, coffee has been traditionally discriminated by trade
and exchange policies, resulting in many cases in a negative rate of protection.
197.  Complex export procedures and taxation schemes act as disincentives  for quality
production and the quality coffee competitiveness and profitability.  It is important to
revise and correct policies that reduce the competitiveness  and profitability  of Central
American coffee exports. Policies may include: defining region-wide  standards and
protocols that establish criteria for the recognition of coffee regions (such as Antigua
coffee); extending tax incentives for importing technology such as environmentally
friendly coffee processing; justifying or phasing out remaining export taxes for coffee31;
and reducing transaction costs and barriers by streamlining exporting procedures.
198.  Finally, it is important to include coffee in trade negotiations, especially in new
markets and internal Latin American markets.  Import tariffs on coffee  from countries in
the region must be revised.  Lower tariffs are related to higher competitiveness, larger
profits and, potentially, quality increases.
3' Some small level of export levies may be justifiable  to finance  the public institutions involved  in the
coffee  sector as many Central American countries are  doing currently.69
Table X-1. Coffee Trade Policies in Central America
Issue  Implication
Coffee was excluded from  Domestic coffee markets are small, and coffee firms do not
free trade in the Central  have the possibility of benefiting from the larger Central
America Common Market  American  market envisioned in the customs union agreement.
Agreement  signed in 1960.  Inter-regional  coffee trade is treated as third county imports,
restricting coffee trade and investment in the region.  This also
restricts coordinated  region-wide responses to the coffee crisis.
Nations collect export taxes  The export taxes and charges  and the exchange rate penalty
and charges for coffee  reduce price-competitiveness.  The export taxes and charges
institutes and coffee funds.  reach  an annual amount of US$25 million for the whole
Foreign exchange earnings are  region.  However, a small levy on exports to finance public
surrendered at official rates.  coffee institutes may be justifiable.
Exporter registration and  Barriers to entry are erected and transactions costs can be
bonding requirements.  considerable.  These are somewhat diminished through "one
Requirement  to present export  stop export shops,"  but can be nonetheless significant.  This
contracts to government  tends to concentrate  the players and increase the bargaining
institutions before shipment.  position of traders and exporters  who are already in the export
Export certificate are also  and trading business, further restricting farmers'  share in the
required, as well as a central  value of their product.
bank export permit for each
shipment.
National export quotas were  However, those quotas left a legacy, which includes coffee
prevalent in previous ICO  laws, and quasi-public  agencies, which administered these
agreements.  The current ICO  quotas, among other responsibilities.  These organizations
does not include quotas.  concentrated  on taxation and burdensome  regulations and did
not pay enough attention to trade promotion,  trade facilitation,
and quality enhancement.
All these trade controls,  Coffee agencies and councils should refrain from interfering in
largely without constructive  trade regulation,  collect their fees with a minimum  distortion
purpose, exist in an industry  effect on the market (particularly separating the funding
largely made up of poor  requirement from export regulatory requirement and
farmers, who are unable to  burdensome  transaction cost).
withstand price or weather
crises, and who still must
realize  quality improvements.70
XI. SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
199.  Central American coffee producing  countries are at crossroads.  Coffee prices  in
2002 are at record lows.  Persistent global over-production and stagnant consumption has
led to accumulation of inventories  and competition between origins has intensified.
Coffee prices have plummeted below costs of production for many coffee producers and
this is causing hardships for coffee farmers  worldwide, including Central America.
Indeed, the current coffee crisis seems to be structural  in nature: the increase in
production of Brazil and Vietnam  (two low cost producers) along with higher flexibility
in blending coffees by roasters (using steaming methods to disguise quality
imperfections)  is creating  a new environment for Central American countries.  At the
same time, quality coffees can at times command significant premiums and there are
expanding markets for specialty  coffees (gourmet,  sustainable, fair-trade, organic,  etc.).
200.  Coffee growers in Central America are facing new challenges.  These challenges
call for new strategies,  the centerpiece of which must be the broad-based sustainable
development of their rural economies.  The paper deals with the impacts and strategies to
deal with the crisis.
201.  An initial assessment of the impact of the crisis on Central American countries
yields the following observations:
•  The impact of the crisis on the macroeconomic situation is not as significant
compared to the sector specific impacts.  While export revenues have
significantly declined  (by about 44%), this loss of export revenues  accounts for
only 1.2% of the GDP. On the other hand, the crisis has contributed to the
deterioration of the BOP deficit for Central America which reached  6% of the
GDP.
o  The crisis is more pronounced in terms of loss of employment, revenues by small
farmers and repayment of debt by medium and larger farmers.  Employment in
the coffee sector is a significant percent of rural labor force, on average around
28% for Central America as a whole, and up to 42% in some countries such as
Nicaragua.  The loss of permanent employment due to the crisis is estimated to
be 54% while the loss in seasonal employment is estimated to be 21%.
o  Problems in loan repayments by coffee producers  are evident in all Central
American countries, particularly in El Salvador and Nicaragua,  accentuating
problems  for some financial institutions.
o  While, with the exception of El Salvador, the overall coffee production and
yields have been increasing in Central America during the  1990s, there was a
decline in both production and yields between 2000 and 2001, which is partly
due to low coffee prices.
202.  The surveys of coffee producing  countries in Central America point out some
strengths that these countries have:
o  Costs of production have been in line with other major coffee producing
countries, but higher compared to some of the most dynamic producers  (e.g.71
Vietnam and India).  Costs of production have also been declining during the
1990s in most Central  American countries.
*  A large percentage  of the coffees produced can be classified  as high and strictly
high (altitude) grown.  This indicates the significant potential for improving
quality and penetrating niche markets (gourmet and other specialty).
*  Central American countries have done a good job so far in penetrating  gourmet
and niche coffee markets.  In particular  Costa Rica and Guatemala manage to sell
a high proportion of their coffees  (about 35-50%) into differentiated  and specialty
markets.  Exports to organic and fair-trade markets is limited (less than  1%) but
growing.  Other countries, notably Honduras and Nicaragua,  have a high
potential for selling more into differentiated and specialty  markets.  And all
Central American countries can significantly increase their exports  into organic
and fair-trade niches.
203.  Central American countries have, to a large extent,  responded to the coffee crisis,
but in a very traditional way.  The focus of the responses has mainly, if not exclusively,
been to support prices to coffee farmers and to restructure the debt of the segment that
enjoys access to formal  credit.  These programs tend to be regressive in the sense that
they tend to benefit proportionally more the larger farmers.  Needed structural changes to
reposition the coffee sector in these countries, improve marketing of coffee (gourmet and
niche markets), improve quality and reduce costs, support for diversification  in marginal
(non-competitive)  areas, have been slow to come.  The focus is to keep producers  in
coffee by supporting prices and solving their debt problems.  While this type of solution
might mitigate the immediate problem, it does not pave the way for the longer term
viability of the coffee sector in these countries.
204.  What needs to be done to address the longer term viability of the Central American
coffee sector?  As it was discussed earlier, the longer term solution lies within the context
of sustainable rural economic development of these countries.  But there are also some
very specific coffee based solutions that can be pursued in parallel.  Some of these
solutions  can already be found applied in certain Central American  countries, but more
can be done and in a more systematic way.
205.  Specific strategies focus on two main areas: solutions for farmers who will be able
to stay competitive in coffee and solutions for farmers that will not be able to stay
competitive.  For the former, solutions focus on improving quality, marketing, and
technology.  For the latter, solutions will focus on devising strategies to diversify out of
coffee.  Along with these solutions, there is a need to address the social and
environmental issues that arise with the current coffee crisis.  Also, solutions to improve
competitiveness  and introduce diversification programs have implication for the
environment and social issues.
206.  Improving competitiveness:  coffee  quality and marketing.  Central America's
advantage in the coffee market lies in having many growing areas with the adequate agro-
ecological conditions to produce high quality coffee.  Although certain countries in the
region have made progress is exploiting this advantage (notably Costa Rica and72
Guatemala)  others have done little.  Overall, the region has significant potential to
improve quality and penetrate high quality,  specialty market segments for coffee.  Quality
improvement programs should aim at improving quality in primary production and also
in coffee milling (beneficio  seco y humedo).
207.  Earlier work by IDB/WB/USAID  has identified four key elements  in a strategy to
promote quality.  These are:
o  Understanding and evaluating coffee quality;
o  Identify the key problems that affect quality;
o  Defining the alternatives for overcoming these problems; and
o  Determining public policies and investments (public and private) that will
facilitate the adoption of these alternatives.
208.  To be effective, a quality enhancement  strategy would need to be comprehensive
and be applied throughout the entire  coffee production chain-harvest and post harvest.
Special focus should be devoted to four areas:
o  Identifying and supporting the geographic  areas with suitable agro-ecological
conditions for quality production;
o  Guaranteeing the production of quality beans, by designing and implementing
broad coffee bean management and programs aimed at reducing defects;  and
o  Pursuing value-added and marketing  strategies  aimed at building partnerships and
long-term market links, receiving higher premiums for quality, and accessing
high revenue segments of the market.
o  Explore some useful promotional  strategies  such as e-trade and auctions, cup of
excellence,  campaigns to promote internal  consumption and markct information
systems.  Promotional policies  should also focus on farmers  and try to
disseminate  information about the environmental benefits of coffee along with
best practices.
209.  Related to the issue of improving competitiveness is improving the ability to deal
with price shocks.  The use of risk management instruments  can reduce price uncertainty
and protect farmers against negative price shocks.  This may  improve access to credit and
increase flexibility in marketing decisions.
210.  Devising a diversification  strategy for non-competitive coffee farmers.
Developing a successful strategy for agricultural diversification requires a systems
approach,  covering both agricultural and business constraints,  along with environmental
and social issues at the same time.  Factors to be addressed should include reliable
agricultural  support services;  research and extension in production, marketing, and
promotion; credit;  infrastructure;  technical assistance and training in business and risk
management;  and market intelligence  and regulation.  Although some coffee producers
might not be competitive,  it is important for the for the government to resist temptation in
picking winners or losers.  Enabling conditions for diversification  are in  many
circumstances similar to those for promoting increased competitiveness.  And both require
a broad-based sustainable  rural development strategy.73'
211.  Addressing social  issues.  Social vulnerability also must be reduced,  in both the
short and long term. To assist coffee producers,  workers, and their families, better social
protection is needed (particularly short-term actions such as safety nets and mechanisms
to improve food security). To protect small coffee producers  who are vulnerable to price
shifts, price risk insurance mechanisms and similar instruments should be developed  and
adopted.  More research is needed to assess the income and consumption impacts of the
coffee crisis on producers and laborers, and other economic agents directly and indirectly
linked to the coffee sector.  Such research would quantify the impacts and be used to help
identify appropriate strategies, target groups and instruments for social protection
programs designed to address  the crisis.
212.  Increasing the environmental awareness of coffee  production.  Finally, a
sustainable  strategy for the coffee sector must consider the environment.  Sound
environmental management can enhance coffee quality and productivity, profitability,
competitiveness,  and sustainability of coffee systems. In addition, it can maintain land
productivity  and provides value-added  market opportunities  (such as conservation  coffees
and environmental  services).  Strategies must work with environmental  programs,
exploring the potential  positive externalities  between environmental  sustainability and
actions to promote coffee quality enhancement  and diversification.  At a minimum, any
coffee quality and diversification strategies  to be implemented should not have negative
impacts on the environment,  especially  on biodiversity and water use.  Similarly,  social
impacts of any strategies should be considered.  Active partnerships with NGOs, as well
as work with research and extension centers with expertise and experience in
environmental  management, can serve these ends.
213.  Institutional Issues.  Public and private sector coffee institutions in Central
America can play a key role in promoting competitiveness of the coffee sector.  An
important first step will be for a country to define its coffee strategy to respond to the
new challenges  and changes of the world coffee market.  Coordinated  measures will
reflect a combination of social priorities, economic  capacity, and political resolve.  These
must be harnessed  in longer-term  programs but that can also produce some tangible
results in the short-run.  Specific areas and programs  that public and private institutions
in Central America can promote could include:  (a)  promoting the production, processing,
marketing and promotion of quality coffees;  (b)  supporting the organization of small
farmers; (c) providing effective technical assistance,  market information, research and
extension to growers; and (d)  facilitating partnerships and alliances between local and
foreign partners.74
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